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CONSTRUCTIVE UNILATERAL THREATS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:
THE LIMITED CASE FOR SECTION 301
ALAN 0. SYKES*
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows the United States
to threaten, and if necessary to impose, trade sanctions against
countries that engage in certain "unfair" international trade
practices. This Article defends the use of Section 301 to induce
other nations to fulfill their legal obligations to the United States
under international trade agreements that lack effective third-
party dispute resolution. It also develops a limited argument for
the use of Section 301 against practices that do not violate any
international agreement, principally when a foreign country in-
creases its level of protection, when it takes inappropriate advan-
tage of loopholes or ambiguities in existing trade agreements, or
when (as with many developing countries) it maintains a high
level of protection relative to the United States yet is the benefi-
ciary of important trade preferences. Finally, the Article reviews
the history of Section 301 cases to date and suggests tentatively
that the statute has proven reasonably successful at promoting
the national economic interest.
In the years since World War II, tariffs and other barriers to interna-
tional commerce have declined dramatically pursuant to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)' and other international com-
pacts.2 Yet substantial barriers to trade remain that are outside the cover-
age of existing international agreements or reflect imperfect compliance
with those agreements. Exporters can gain much from the reduction of
these remaining barriers and, therefore, pressure their political represent-
atives to pursue market-opening initiatives. For the most part, these ini-
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I have received thoughtful comments on earlier drafts
from Ian Ayres, Abram Chayes, Gary Horlick, Louis Kaplan, Mark Ramseyer, Eric Rasmusen, Alan
Schwartz, and from participants in workshops at Georgetown, Harvard, and Yale Universities. I
thank the Scaife Foundation for financial support.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 36-37 (1990) (discuss-
ing impact of GATT on reducing tariffs).
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tiatives involve proposals for additional bilateral or multilateral conces-
sions in a variety of sectors, many as part of the continuing Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations.
Offers of reciprocal concessions, however, are not the only strategy for
opening foreign markets. Instead, foreign governments may be threatened
with sanctions if they maintain existing trade barriers. The United States
employs these threat strategies to a considerably greater extent than any
other nation, usually pursuant to Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974' (Section 301). This statute authorizes the United States Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR) to challenge a foreign government practice that in-
fringes upon U.S. rights under a trade agreement" or is otherwise "unjus-
tifiable,"5 "unreasonable or discriminatory," 6 and "burdens or restricts
United States commerce."' 7 Initially, the USTR must negotiate for the
elimination of the practice at issue, but it has broad authority to retaliate
when negotiations fail. Further, the statute does not provide the USTR
with the authority to make concessions in return for the elimination of an
objectionable practice. Thus, when the United States proceeds under Sec-
tion 301, it has made an important strategic decision- a decision to util-
ize the "stick" rather than the "carrot."'
On its face, Section 301 can encompass virtually any foreign govern-
ment practice unilaterally deemed objectionable by the United States,
whether relating to U.S. imports, U.S. exports, U.S. investments, or any
other matter of commercial significance. Since its inception, however, the
3. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1988).
4. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(A).
5. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
6. Id. § 2411(b)(1).
7. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1).
8. The economic literature contains little analysis of the use of threat strategies to open foreign
markets. Rather, the use of strategic analysis in modern international trade theory is largely limited to
two topics. The first concerns "optimal tariff" or subsidy battles between countries with the ability to
influence their terms of trade (i.e., a degree of market power). See, e.g., Harry Johnson, Optimal
Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. ECON. STUD. 142 (1953); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, A
Theory of Managed Trade, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 779 (1990). The second is "strategic trade policy,"
whereby nations compete with each other to capture rents in industries with supracompetitive returns
attributable to increasing returns or positive externalities. A useful collection of essays is found in
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Paul R. Krugman ed.,
1986). Two rare examples of papers devoted to the class of issues considered in this paper are Richard
E. Baldwin, Optimal Tariff Retaliation Rules, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 108 (Ronald W. Jones & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1990); and John McMillan, Strategic Bar-
gaining and Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 203 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Pat-
rick eds., 1990). The AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM volume contains a number of other useful essays,
which focus primarily on the "Super 301" provisions of the 1988 trade act. These provisions have
now expired and consequently are not directly addressed in this Article.
[Vol. 23
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overwhelming majority of Section 301 actions have involved practices im-
peding U.S. exports. A handful of other cases have involved impediments
to U.S. investment abroad, the refusal of foreign governments to afford
intellectual property protection to U.S. firms, and foreign practices that
restrict the ability of U.S. firms to purchase natural resources or other
raw materials from abroad. Section 301 has been invoked infrequently
with the objective of protecting U.S. firms from import competition. 9 In
this respect, Section 301 is sharply distinguishable from other U.S. trade
statutes such as the tariff schedules,1" the antidumping1" and counter-
vailing duty laws," and the escape clause." These other statutes are in-
trinsically protectionist and are ordinarily detrimental to the national eco-
nomic interest. 4 By contrast, successful actions under Section 301 almost
invariably benefit the U.S. economy, other things being equal.
The domestic benefits of Section 301, however, afford little comfort to
officials in other nations, who often react with indignity to the initiation of
Section 301 proceedings and maintain that the very existence of Section
301 is objectionable.1 ' Participants in the Uruguay Round of GATT ne-
gotiations have urged the United States to abolish Section 301 alto-
gether. 6 The Director-General of GATT recently characterized Section
301 as "a good example of what our world could come to" if the present
Uruguay Round of GATT talks fails, arguing that unilateral action
9. See infra note 141 and Appendix for a summary of Section 301 actions to date.
10. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 3001 (1988).
11. Id. §§ 1673, 1677(k).
12. Id. §§ 1303, 1671.
13. Id. §§ 2251-2252.
14. For an elementary exposition of the costs of protectionism through conventional tariffs or
quantitative restrictions, see, e.g., PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 17-19, 175-77
(1985); DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 536-45 (2d ed. 1990). For critical analysis of particu-
lar U.S. trade statutes, see, e.g., John J. Barcelo, III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It,
in I ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 53 (John H. Jackson ed., 1979); Alan 0.
Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989); Richard
Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of United States
Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507 (1990); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE &
ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE (1986) (escape clause).
15. See, e.g., U.S. Comes Under Attack Over Trade Policy at GATT Council Meeting, Defends
Super 301, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 830 (June 28, 1989) (U.S. attacked for citing
Japan, India, and Brazil for possible sanctions); U.S. Delays 301 Oilseeds Decision Until GATT
Panel Produces Finding, EC Reacts Sharply, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 894 (July 12,
1989) (U.S. attacked for citing E.C. for possible sanctions).
16. See GATT's Dunkel Criticizes U.S. 301 Law, Urges Continued Commitment to GATT
Round, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (May 24, 1990), available in WESTLAW, International
Database, BNA-BTD File.
1991-1992]
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under Section 301 undermines the multilateralism of the GATT system. 17
Academic commentary is often equally critical."
Although international political opposition to Section 301 is readily un-
derstandable, the mere fact that Section 301 elicits criticism abroad is not
enough to establish its folly. One might argue, for example, that if Section
301 actions regularly succeed at opening foreign markets, all nations bene-
fit-the United States and sometimes other exporting nations gain the op-
portunity to make profitable sales, while importing nations avoid the inef-
ficiencies that would otherwise likely attend their protectionist policies.
Perhaps a certain amount of political discomfort should be tolerated if the
result is a more open trading system and an improved allocation of
resources.
An obvious counterargument is that whatever the success of the "stick"
at reducing protection abroad, it nevertheless seems inferior to the "car-
rot." If the United States obtains access to foreign markets through recip-
rocal concessions rather than threats of retaliation, the economic gains are
usually greater, because protection diminishes in the United States as
well. Further, the "carrot" avoids the political tensions accompanying
threats to use the "stick" and thus contributes generally to international
harmony. Therefore, the argument might run, the United States should
eschew efforts to open foreign markets through unilateral threats of retali-
ation, even if those threats succeed with some regularity, and rely exclu-
sively upon reciprocal concessions.
Both of these positions, however, are too simplistic. Although reciprocal
trade agreements have considerable virtue, they are only useful if the par-
ties adhere to them. And, to provide an incentive for compliance, some
sanction must exist for non-compliance. When concern for reputation is
not enough to induce nations to honor their commitments and when trade
agreements do not provide effective third-party dispute resolution with the
power to coerce compliance, a powerful argument can be made for unilat-
eral or "self-help" measures to penalize a breach of promise.
In another recent article, I discussed the 1988 "mandatory retaliation"
amendments to Section 301 (Section 301(a)), which apply when the
United States asserts that a foreign government practice violates an ex-
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
63-67 (Douglas A. Irwin ed., 1991); Jagdish Bhagwati, Agressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 8, at 1; Jim Powell, Why Trade Retaliation Closes Mar-
kets and Impoverishes People, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 143, Nov. 1990, at 6-11; Thomas 0.
Bayard, Comment on Alan Sykes' "Mandatory Retaliation For Breach of Trade Agreements: Some
Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301," 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 325 (1990).
[Vol. 23
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isting trade agreement.' I argued that these amendments, on their face,
seem a sensible strategic adaptation to the imperfections of dispute resolu-
tion under GATT. Section I of this Article refines and elaborates the the-
oretical argument for unilateral sanctions suggested there, focusing on
four key concerns: the role of renegotiation in lieu of sanction; the strate-
gic choice of measured retaliation in preference to more substantial sanc-
tions; the importance of disabling opportunism under the statute; and the
likelihood that large nations such as the United States are better able to
devise effective unilateral sanctions than small nations, arguably creating
a considerable asymmetry in the ability to utilize threats. It concludes that
unilateral sanctions by large nations in response to a breach of agreement
can nevertheless be in the joint interest of parties to such agreements,
large and small, and that the key features of Section 301(a) provide valua-
ble leverage to the United States while disabling the most obvious forms of
opportunism. One cannot rule out the possibility, however, that threats
pursuant to Section 301(a) will fail to induce compliance with trade
agreements and instead precipitate trade wars and increased protectionism
on the part of all parties. Thus, the value of unilateral sanctions policy
under Section 301(a) is ultimately an empirical issue.
Section II addresses a set of issues not considered at all in the earlier
article-whether it is ever desirable to threaten sanctions when the foreign
government behavior at issue is perfectly legal under existing international
agreements and thus cannot be characterized as a breach of promise."0
Even here, the "stick" may provide a useful alternative to the "carrot,"
under certain limited conditions. The clearest case arises when a foreign
government increases the level of protection in its home market. Another
important class of cases arises when the terms of a trade agreement are
vague to the point of being unenforceable and a signatory takes advantage
of the situation to pursue policies deviating from a mutually advantageous
interpretation of the agreement. A third class of cases involves developing
nations that have a high average level of protection and already receive
substantial trade preferences on their exports to developed nations. This
list is not necessarily exhaustive-indeed, it is difficult to rule out conclu-
sively the utility of the "stick" in any case when the chances for success
are high and political constraints make the "carrot" infeasible. It is possi-
ble, however, to identify large classes of cases in which threats are partic-
19. Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory Retaliation"for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts
on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301 (1990).
20. Academic criticism of Section 301(b) has been especially harsh. See, e.g., Daniel G. Partan,
Retaliation in United States and European Community Trade Law, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 333 (1990);
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 48-57 (1991).
1991-1992]
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ularly unlikely to succeed and Section II develops some important
examples.
Section II concludes with a review of the statutory provisions applicable
to practices that are legal under existing trade agreements-Section
301(b). In contrast to Section 301(a), the statute here provides virtually no
guidance to the USTR regarding the appropriate circumstances for the
use of threats. As a consequence, the danger arises that the statute will be
used opportunistically or imprudently, and an argument can be made for
amending it to disable such uses. Without such amendment, the value of
Section 301(b) as an instrument of trade policy depends heavily upon the
ways in which the USTR exercises its relatively unfettered discretion and
upon the extent to which the mere existence of unfettered discretion may
damage the reputation of the United States by raising fears abroad of
opportunism.
In the end, however, the theoretical analysis simply confirms that threat
strategies can serve a constructive purpose in various kinds of trade dis-
putes and also confirms the potential for threats to backfire and precipi-
tate greater protectionism. The case for a statute such as Section 301,
therefore, must ultimately rest on empiricism. Section III develops some
initial, tentative evidence about the consequences of Section 301 in prac-
tice. Drawing upon a compilation in the Appendix of every Section 301
investigation to date, Section III argues that threats pursuant to Section
301 have been quite successful at securing concessions by foreign govern-
ments. The actual imposition of sanctions has been infrequent (albeit the
sanctions occasionally have been substantial), and for the most part sanc-
tions have eventually been lifted. These conclusions hold equally for cases
involving alleged violations of trade agreements and those simply challeng-
ing foreign practices as "unfair." Despite the widespread criticism of Sec-
tion 301,21 a plausible case can be made that the statute has been a practi-
cal success. And, although the empirical discussion by no means precludes
the possibility of improving the statute, it does suggest that calls for out-
right repeal of Section 301 may be misguided.
To be sure, Section 301 may require considerable refinement if the
Uruguay Round reaches a successful conclusion. The case for unilateral
threat strategies ultimately rests on the existence of important aspects of
commercial relations that are outside the scope of international compacts,
or that are subject to compacts without effective third-party dispute reso-
lution. The Uruguay Round, if successful, may do much to alleviate both
problems, though it assuredly will not solve all of them. The possible im-
21. See supra note 20.
[Vol. 23
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plications for Section 301 of a Uruguay Round agreement are discussed
briefly at the end of Section I.
I. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS FOR BREACH OF PROMISE IN TRADE
AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 301(A)
Exchange creates value, and contracts facilitate exchange when the par-
ties cannot conclude all aspects of the transaction immediately and simul-
taneously. But contracts can only serve this function if the parties expect
promises to be kept, at least with sufficient probability. It is in the con-
tracting parties' interest ex ante, therefore, that some means for enforcing
the bargain exist ex post.
Lawyers are intimately familiar with one mechanism for the enforce-
ment of contractual promises-the lawsuit, either for specific performance
or for damages. An appropriately designed system of contract law en-
hances the returns to contracting by encouraging parties to perform their
part of the contract when performance is economical. Contract law can
also provide incentives for parties to take precaution against contingencies
that may make performance more costly and to take other measures to
increase the gains from trade.
Even for domestic contracts between private actors, however, this sys-
tem of enforcement has significant drawbacks. It requires the existence of
some third party with the authority to resolve matters of controversy and
the coercive power to enforce its judgments. At a minimum, such third-
party enforcement is costly. Further, one or both parties may lack confi-
dence in the third-party decision-maker's ability to resolve conflicts objec-
tively and competently. As a consequence, complete or partial substitutes
for third-party dispute resolution evolve in various contexts. The parties
may rely upon "self-help" remedies of one sort or another, as with the
repossession remedy in certain consumer sales agreements." Alternatively,
especially in long-term relationships, the parties may design their contract
as best they can to reduce the danger of opportunistic behavior and the
associated disputes requiring formal intermediation. 3 In the extreme case,
22. To be sure, such remedies may be constrained by legal rules that are enforceable through
third-party dispute resolution. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-22 (3d
ed. 1986).
23. See Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustments in Long Term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369, 370-71 (1987) (focus on quantity
and price adjustment mechanisms in petroleum coke contracts which enable the parties to curtail
mutually harmful behavior); Paul J. Joskow, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of
Coal, 31 J.L. & ECON. 47, 51 (1988) (major challenge in structuring long-term contracts involves
specifying price adjustment provisions to guard against opportunistic behavior and implementing pro-
visions that do not lead to adaptation problems during the contractual relationship).
1991-1992]
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an agreement may not be viable unless each party can induce the other to
honor its promises simply by threatening to dissolve the agreement in the
event of a breach.24
The difficulties with third-party enforcement are compounded when
applied to "contracts" among nations. The very existence of national
boundaries is evidence of a reluctance to cede sovereign powers to entities
outside them. And, although some authority to resolve disputes and to
exercise enforcement authority has been vested in entities such as the
United Nations,2" those powers are quite limited and have never extended
to the subject of interest here-international trade agreements. As a conse-
quence, appropriate unilateral strategies to encourage compliance with
these agreements can be valuable.
A. The Imperfections of GATT Dispute Resolution and the Limits of
Reputational Incentives for Compliance
Neither third-party enforcement mechanisms nor unilateral sanctions
policies are logically necessary to induce trading nations to comply with
their commitments under international agreements. By violating such
commitments, a nation will develop a reputation for unreliability, and
thereby, to some extent, discourage other nations from entering future
agreements with it. This loss of prospective opportunities for beneficial
agreements, in the abstract, could suffice to induce all nations to honor
their commitments without any further sanction for breach. In practice,
however, nations do accuse each other of violating their commit-
ments-many of the Section 301 cases enumerated in the Appendix, for
example, involve precisely such an allegation. 2 e It is thus indisputable that
reputational concerns alone are not enough to ensure perfect compliance
with trade agreements, at least in the view of complaining signatories.
Likewise, greater compliance might be secured through the prospect of
additional sanctions for non-compliance.
As suggested above, the parties might create additional sanctions by de-
vising an impartial, third-party dispute resolution process, empowered to
impose punishment for violations of the agreement. Indeed, such a process
may well have been envisioned by the drafters of GATT. Most allegations
24. See L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27, 28-30 (1980);
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302-08 (1978).
25. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 6-9 (1986).
26. Of the 92 cases filed since 1975, 48 have involved the alleged violation of a trade agreement.
See infra note 144 and Appendix.
[Vol. 23
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of non-compliance under GATT are governed by Article XXIII.' When
a dispute arises, the disputants are required to consult with each other to
determine whether an accommodation can be reached. If these consulta-
tions fail to reach an accord, the matter may be referred to a "panel,"
consisting of a group of GATT experts drawn from nations not involved
in the dispute. The panel then rules on the complaint's legal merits, at
which time the disputants are encouraged to enter further consultations in
pursuit of an accord. Failing agreement, the matter is referred to the
GATT "Council," consisting of a representative of each GATT signatory
wishing to participate. The Council can revisit the issues in the dispute
and make its own determination on the merits, or simply "adopt" the
panel's report. If any disputant refuses to abide by the Council's determi-
nation, Article XXIII authorizes the Council to impose sanctions, consist-
ing of the withdrawal of trade concessions otherwise afforded to the recal-
citrant signatory. 8
Although these procedures on their face might seem to provide a rough
equivalent to judicial dispute resolution, in practice they have come to
function quite differently. Perhaps most importantly, as GATT practice
has ultimately evolved, the Council will not act to make a finding on the
merits of a dispute, much less to authorize sanctions, absent a "consensus"
that includes the disputants. Thus, the losing disputant can effectively
prevent the Council from reaching a finding on the merits. 9 A fortiori,
the losing disputant can block any authorization for sanctions, and, as a
27. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII. A roughly similar mechanism for dispute resolution ap-
plies under Article XII, id. art. XII, concerning the use of protective measures for balance of pay-
ments purposes, and under certain provisions of the Tokyo Round Codes. See, e.g., Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT Subsidies Code), done Apr. 12, 1979, art. 13, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619,
1186 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980).
28. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII. For a summary of dispute settlement in GATT, see
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 495-98 (1991). For an extensive
discussion and critique of dispute resolution under GATT, see JACKSON, supra note 2, at 59-69;
Robert E. Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section
301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 503-07 (1975). Much like
this Article, Hudec has recently argued that some degree of "justified disobedience" is desirable when
GATT dispute resolution is inadequate to produce adherence to GATT principles. See Robert E.
Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERAL-
ISM, supra note 8, at 113.
29. A contracting party can generally block acceptance by refusing to join a consensus decision to
accept a working party or panel report. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 59-69.
1991-1992]
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result, sanctions have been authorized only once in the history of
GATT. 0
Thus, the GATT system at present relies little upon true third-party
dispute resolution. Dispute "panels" exist for the purpose of providing
signatories with legal guidance when conflicts of interpretation arise, but
they have no authority to order compliance with their findings or to in-
voke sanctions. GATT signatories acting collectively through the Council
do have the power to authorize sanctions but do not exercise it, preferring
instead to leave the disputants to work out their differences among
themselves."1
It seems unlikely that the drafters of GATT anticipated this evolution
toward deference to consensus. If they had, they probably would not have
bothered to include the now superfluous provisions authorizing sanctions.
In any case, the absence of true third-party enforcement, and the fact that
reputation alone is not a perfect substitute, leaves only one further option
to enhance the level of compliance-the threat of unilateral action by ag-
grieved signatories.
B. Strategic Analysis of Unilateral Sanctions
Trivially, a threat of unilateral sanction for breach of agreement, if ef-
fective, can induce greater compliance with the bargain ex post to the ben-
efit of the nation issuing the threat. Perhaps less obviously, the evolution
of unilateral sanctions policies can promote the mutual interests of parties
to trade agreements ex ante: a properly conceived threat of sanctions for
violations ex post increases the likelihood of compliance ex ante and thus
increases the expected joint gains from entering the agreement. As a con-
sequence, parties will conclude more mutually beneficial agreements.
The proposition that unilateral threats can enhance the level of compli-
ance with agreements and thereby make them more valuable to the parties
follows immediately from some well known results in rudimentary game
theory. A simple illustration will make the point and will suggest some
useful guidelines for the construction of efficient unilateral sanctions.
Consider the following stylized model of the trading relationship be-
tween two countries, A and B. Each country exports only one good to the
other and must choose between two levels of protection for its home mar-
ket-"high" and "low." The decision on the level of protection is made by
self-interested political officials in each nation who desire to maximize
30. In a 1952 decision, the Netherlands was permitted to impose an restriction on U.S. exports
of wheat flour due to U.S. import restraints on Dutch dairy products. GATT, I Supp. B.I.S.D. 32,
64 (1953). See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 63-64.
31. See JOHN J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 180-87 (1969).
[Vol. 23
HeinOnline  -- 23 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 272 1992
CASE FOR SECTION 301
their political welfare. Assume that officials in each nation, acting non-
cooperatively, and thus taking the policy of the other nation as fixed, pre-
fer the "high" level of protection for the home market because it maxi-
mizes the political rewards afforded to them by their import-competing
industries without materially reducing the level of political support af-
forded to them by their exporting industries.
Officials in each nation realize, however, that they can reap political
rewards from their export industry by negotiating an agreement providing
greater access to the export market. To secure such access, suppose they
must in return afford overseas exporters greater access to their home mar-
ket. Such an agreement will be advantageous (putting aside, for the mo-
ment, questions about its enforceability) if the increased political support
from the domestic export industry exceeds the reduced political support
from the domestic import-competing industry that has lost its protection.
Assume this condition holds, and that officials in each nation could in-
crease their political support through a binding, reciprocal agreement to
reduce protection to the "low" level in each country. 2 Assume further
that a "low-low" agreement dominates either possible "low-high"
agreement.
To analyze this strategic environment, one must make some assump-
tions about the timing of the decisions by each nation. For purposes of the
illustration, suppose policy makers decide what policy to pursue in isola-
tion and information about the policy pursued abroad will be revealed
only after each country has made its own choice-a "simultaneous moves"
game. Intuitively, one might imagine that at the beginning of the month,
officials in country A and country B each decide whether to impose
"high" or "low" protection in secret. From the trade statistics and other
information that arrive at the month's end, officials in each country can
infer the other country's choice at the month's beginning, and the political
payoffs associated with the strategy pair chosen will be realized. With this
"simultaneous moves" assumption, the game's strategic structure is in fact
the classic Prisoner's Dilemma.3"
The problem confronting the players is to sustain the mutually advan-
tageous "low-low" bargain over time in the face of the obvious temptation
32. The existence of such opportunities to gain political advantage through reciprocal concessions
provides the conventional interest group explanation for GATT and other trade-liberalizing undertak-
ings. See, e.g., ROBERT E. BALDWIN, TRADE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 137,
144-47 (1988); Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991).
33. See, e.g., ANATOL RAPOPORT, Prisoner's Dilemma, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: GAME THE-
ORY 199 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989). The simultaneous moves assumption is not essential to the
proposition that threat strategies can induce parties to comply.
1991-1992]
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to cheat-after all, no matter what choice is made by officials abroad at
the beginning of the month, officials at home are better off in that month
by choosing "high" protection. To discourage cheating by the other party,
the players must adopt strategies imposing future penalties large enough
to make cheating unprofitable. And, putting aside the use of military force
and other sanctions unrelated to the trade agreement, the threat of retali-
ating with "high" protection in a future period or periods is the only
strategy available. The question then arises whether such retaliatory
threats will suffice.
The "length" of the game is obviously crucial in this regard. The threat
of sanction in a future play of the game is meaningless if the game is
played only once, making the "high-high" outcome inevitable. But trading
relationships between nations are open-ended, and thus the game is in fact
a "repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." Theoretical analysis of this phenome-
non suggests that sustained compliance can emerge if the game has an
"infinite horizon"-that is, if the game does not have a known, final pe-
riod and "discounting" of the future is not too high. The players then can
threaten to respond to a breach of the agreement by the other party with
some sort of retaliatory breach strategy, and this threat can be forever
effective as a deterrent, because the game is never expected to end soon. 4
Arguably, the open-ended duration of typical trade agreements and the
indefinite life expectancy of political parties and other political coalitions
influencing trade policy will lead trade policy officials to view their strate-
gic interaction as having an infinite horizon.
Further, even if trade agreements are more appropriately viewed as "fi-
nite horizon" games, compliance for an extended period is possible. To be
sure, sustained compliance cannot emerge in a game with a known, fixed
final play or in which the future is too heavily discounted, if the players
expect each other to behave fully "rationally" under these conditions.3 "
34. See, e.g., id.; ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 91-94 (1990); DAVID M.
KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIc THEORY 503-06 (1990). This result is a special case of the
"Folk Theorem," which holds that for a large class of infinite horizon repeated games (including the
Prisoner's Dilemma) with sufficiently low discounting of the future, "any combination of actions ob-
served in any finite number of repetitions is the unique outcome of some subgame perfect equilib-
rium." RASMUSEN, supra, at 92; see also KREPS, supra. In other words, a multiplicity of equilibria
exists that are Nash (each player's strategy is at least weakly best given the strategy of the other) and
perfect (roughly, each player's threats are credible, so that the other player expects threatened punish-
ments to be carried out).
35. For a game with a fixed ending, cheating is "inevitable" on the final play because it yields
the maximum payoff to each player in that period regardless of what the other player does-a threat
of future sanction cannot influence behavior. Consequently, the threat of future sanction cannot influ-
ence play in the next to last period either, or in the next-to-next to last, and so forth-by the logic of
"backward induction" the game is said to "unravel" and cheating becomes the dominant strategy in
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But sustained compliance can emerge in a finite game if each player be-
lieves the other player may eschew the logic of cheating and initially com-
ply. That is, if players think there is sufficient probability of the other
player complying for a period, each player may try complying at the out-
set and continue to comply until the other player stops complying, or until
the end of the game approaches and the threat of retaliation by the other
player becomes insufficient to overcome the one-time gains from
cheating."6
Thus, whatever the appropriate conception of the "horizon" in a trade
agreement, theory suggests sustained compliance can emerge under appro-
priate circumstances. This proposition applies equally to the two-country
game sketched above and to an N-country game-an important extension
given that many trade agreements (such as GATT) are multilateral rather
than bilateral.3 "
Theory does not suggest, however, that sustained compliance will neces-
sarily emerge, only that the possibility exists."8 Experimental studies thus
provide a useful supplement to theoretical analysis of the repeated Pris-
oner's Dilemma and tend to confirm the possibility of compliance emerg-
ing often, 9 especially when the gains from compliance are considerable.'0
Some experimentalists tout the virtues of particular strategies for achiev-
ing the benefits of compliance, such as the "tit for tat" strategy whereby a
player complies on the first play and then responds to each period of
cheating by his opponent with a single period of cheating in retaliation."'
every period of play. A similar problem arises with heavy discounting because the threat of future
sanction becomes insufficient to wipe out gains from cheating in the current period. See RASMUSEN,
supra note 34, at 91-94.
36. Id. at 118-19.
37. See id. at 92-93; see also ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT
331 (1991).
38. See RASMUSEN, supra note 34, at 91-94; KREPS, supra note 34, at 507-08.
39. Interestingly, the experimental work also suggests that cooperation can emerge in the finite
game. See RAPAPORT, supra note 33, at 201.
40.
[Firequencies of cooperative choices in iterated plays vary as expected with the payoffs
associated with the outcomes. The larger the rewards associated with reciprocated coopera-
tion or the larger the punishments associated with double defection, the more frequent are
the cooperative choices. The larger the punishment associated with unreciprocated coopera-
tion, the more frequent are the defecting choices, and so on.
Id.
41. A leading work on the "tit for tat" strategy is ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984). For cautions, see RAPAPORT, supra note 33, at 202; RASMUSEN, supra note
34, at 91-92, 119-20.
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The utility of other strategies cannot be ruled out, however, and certainly
no consensus exists as to any single "optimal" strategy.
This discussion of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, as noted, is meant
to be illustrative rather than to suggest the Prisoner's Dilemma is the only
acceptable strategic description of trade agreement games. Indeed, the
strategic interaction among parties to trade agreements is plainly far more
complex. Such agreements ordinarily encompass many commodities, and it
is possible to vary the level of protection for the home market continuously
through incremental changes in tariffs, quotas, and other trade restric-
tions. In fact, the strategic options are broader yet. Because governments
interact on a wide range of issues in addition to trade, threats and conces-
sions can cut across all manners of diplomatic concerns. Further, the ex-
tension of the analysis from two to N countries is by no means trivial and
may be radically more difficult for strategic structures other than the Pris-
oner's Dilemma. And, the stylized simultaneous moves assumption is not
self-evidently the most realistic. One might instead contemplate a stylized
sequential moves game. It is also possible that, at times, no sanctions will
exist that do not damage the political interests of officials who impose
them, and hence the credibility of the threat to impose sanctions may be
jeopardized.
In short, no game-theoretic model yet devised and analyzed captures the
full complexity of actual trade agreements. Nevertheless, the insights of
game theory generally, and the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in particu-
lar, support several intuitively appealing propositions about the value of
unilateral threats in trade agreements. First, even when third-party en-
forcement to ensure compliance is unavailable, there is reason to be opti-
mistic that strategies designed to elicit compliance from other countries
will allow the gains from compliance to be realized. Indeed, this proposi-
tion is trivially confirmed by the mere existence of trade agreements, for
nations would not bother to incur the costs of negotiating them if the ex-
pected level of compliance was negligible. Our knowledge of the repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma and similar repeated games thus affords an important
component of any positive theory about the existence of agreements lack-
ing effective third-party dispute resolution, such as GATT.
Second, to induce another country to comply, each country must adopt a
strategy to penalize cheating to some extent. If another country knows
cheating will never be punished, by contrast, it will surely exploit the
situation by deviating from the bargain. A fortiori, if another country
knows cheating will be rewarded, it will exploit the situation. A strategy
to induce compliance by other countries must therefore employ the "stick"
rather than the "carrot."
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Third, if cheating is to be dissuaded, the magnitude of threatened sanc-
tions must be sufficient to wipe out the gains. This observation suggests
the possible virtue of heavy sanctions, although the question remains
whether all "cheating" should be deterred.
Finally, implicit in the logic of how to sustain compliance, the mere
announcement of an intention to punish cheating is not enough. Other
countries must believe the threat. If another country engages in a period
of cheating to test the threat's credibility, the threatened sanction must be
utilized.
C. Complications
Although the case for some manner of unilateral policy to dissuade
breach of agreement seems compelling, a variety of additional considera-
tions bear upon its proper design. The role of renegotiation in lieu of
sanction, for example, has yet to be discussed. Further, just as in contracts
between private actors, compliance with obligations ex post may not al-
ways be desirable-breach of agreement may be "efficient" in a sense to
be defined below-a proposition that has important implications for the
proper magnitude of sanctions. In addition, although unilateral sanctions
may serve a valuable function in policing opportunistic behavior, so may
the domestic authority to impose "sanctions" be employed opportunisti-
cally. This danger must be avoided. Finally, the ability of nations to im-
pose significant sanctions upon trading partners may vary considerably
with their size and the strategic environment in which only one nation can
issue credible threats against the other will be considered below.
1. Renegotiation
The simple strategic framework of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
admits of only one strategy for policing the bargain-the threat to retract
the initial trade concession. Often, however, compensatory concessions by
the party wishing to deviate from the agreement may provide an alterna-
tive to the imposition of sanctions for both nations. In effect, the parties
might renegotiate the bargain in response to breach.
To be sure, renegotiation would make little sense if the political costs
and benefits of alternative concessions were known with certainty at the
time of the initial negotiations. The parties would simply strike the best
bargain possible at the outset, and any subsequent effort to retract a con-
cession would represent opportunistic behavior deserving of sanction. In-
deed, game theorists often worry about opportunistic renegotiation as a
threat to the stability of the bargain. If renegotiation could yield an agree-
ment that was better for all concerned than the outcome in which the
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defector is "punished," the temptation to defect is obviated because every-
one might prefer renegotiation to punishment. This problem is akin to,
though not quite the same as, the problem arising if threats of punishment
are not credible, and it has led theorists to explore the possibility of "rene-
gotiation-proof" equilibria for games. 2
Yet GATT dispute resolution, as noted, relies heavily upon renegoti-
ation as an alternative to sanctions. 43 While renegotiation might in princi-
ple represent opportunism, it can also facilitate a mutually advantageous
adjustment of the bargain. Trade concessions are made under conditions
of uncertainty, and the costs and benefits of alternative concessions may
change over time. It is well accepted, for example, that industries in the
United States and elsewhere tend to intensify their political efforts to se-
cure protection as their financial condition worsens, and the events affect-
ing financial conditions, industry-by-industry, are no doubt difficult to
forecast. 4' Thus, a bargain that increases the expected welfare of the offi-
cials who negotiate it ex ante may prove unfortunate for them ex post. As
a consequence, they may wish to avoid their initial commitments, not sim-
ply as an effort to "cheat" on the bargain, but because the political costs
of performance prove unexpectedly high. Just as concessions appearing
attractive ex ante may become unattractive ex post, however, so may con-
cessions appearing unattractive ex ante become attractive ex post. In many
cases, therefore, the parties may find it advantageous to substitute one set
of concessions for another through renegotiation. The possibility of rene-
gotiation of this sort makes concessions more attractive ex ante-the ex-
pected gains from the initial concessions increase, because officials know
that the concessions can be retracted under certain adverse contingencies
without incurring sanction. More concessions will be made ex ante, and
the level of protection will tend to decline.
This analysis suggests that parties to trade agreements may well want
to respond initially to a breach of promise with an offer to accept compen-
satory concessions. If so, sanctions are inappropriate unless the proffered
compensation is insufficient to restore the value of the bargain. The struc-
ture of GATT provides considerable evidence showing the desirability of
such a policy-if renegotiation were typically a manifestation of opportu-
nistic behavior rather than an efficient ex post adjustment of obligations,
the drafters of GATT would likely have undertaken to discourage renego-
tiation, when in fact they did much the opposite.
42. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 174-81 (1991).
43. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
44. See Sykes, supra note 32, at 276-77.
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2. Efficient Breach and the Magnitude of Sanctions
A related complication concerns the possibility of trade concessions
proving inefficiently burdensome ex post under circumstances in which
renegotiation is excessively costly or otherwise problematic due to strategic
behavior. The analogue from the literature on private contracts is the pos-
sibility that the cost of performance ex post will exceed its value to the
parties, and that "efficient breach" in such cases may be better facilitated
by a damages remedy than by forced renegotiation or "specific
performance."
To clarify, consider for a moment the private contract analogy. Suppose
a seller can produce some good or service at a cost "c," where c is a
random variable not known to the seller until some date in the future
when production occurs. A buyer will value the good or service on that
date at "V." Suppose the parties enter the contract for the seller to supply
the good or service at price "p," but when the time to produce arrives, the
realized value of c exceeds V, so that the cost of performance exceeds the
benefits. Because the seller would lose more than the buyer gains, it is
efficient for the seller to breach the contract.
In principle, the possibility of renegotiation can suffice to ensure effi-
cient breach. In the example above, the seller could simply approach the
buyer and offer some amount at least equal to V minus p but no greater
than c minus p to extinguish the contractual obligation. The buyer will be
in at least as good a position by accepting such an offer as by insisting
upon performance, and the seller will also be as well situated, with one or
both of them strictly benefitting.
Interestingly, however, contract law does not rely entirely upon renego-
tiation to ensure efficient breach. If it did, it would suffice for courts to
award specific performance in any breach of contract action and to let the
parties renegotiate against that backdrop. Instead, the seller often has the
option to breach the contract without renegotiating and pay "expectation
damages," in this example equal to V minus p. This measure of damages
will encourage the seller to perform when performance is efficient, yet
ensure the profitability of breach when breach is efficient. 45 The reason
that courts distrust the specific performance remedy in many cases and
provide the expectation damages alternative is neither obvious nor uncon-
troversial. Perhaps the transaction costs of renegotiation against a back-
drop of specific performance exceed the costs of renegotiation against a
45. In an instance when c > V, the seller would prefer to pay V - p rather than incur the loss
from performance of p - c. The loss p - c is smaller than V - p, by contrast, when c < V. See, e.g.,
Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980).
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backdrop of a damages remedy, or perhaps the courts prefer to avoid any
involvement in policing compliance with a specific performance order."'
In any event, a parallel to the efficient breach concept and to damages
as an alternative to renegotiation arises in international trade agreements.
Clearly, signatories would contract ex ante to allow avoidance of obliga-
tions ex post whenever the costs of avoidance to adversely affected parties
are exceeded by the benefits to the party released from performance.' 7 In
other words, from the standpoint of the officials who negotiate the agree-
ment, breach may be "efficient" in a political sense, and it is in their
mutual interest ex ante to facilitate such breach. 8 Not surprisingly, there-
fore, GATT contains express provisions allowing signatories to avoid their
commitments."9
Further, these provisions allow the avoidance of commitments even if
renegotiation fails to reach a satisfactory outcome for those adversely af-
fected. Under Article XXVIII, for example, a signatory wishing to raise a
tariff above its negotiated ceiling may do so, and adversely affected parties
are then entitled to withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions."5 A
similar principle applies when signatories invoke the Article XIX "escape
clause" and negotiations over compensatory concessions are unsuccessful."1
Although the phrase "substantially equivalent concessions" is not defined,
it suggests a level of concessions affecting a volume of trade comparable to
that affected by the concessions withdrawn by the other party. 52 Thus,
while parties may well debate whether or not some proposed withdrawal
is precisely "equivalent," the "substantial equivalence" requirement
places reasonably tight limits on the penalty for withdrawal of concessions
46. See POSNER, supra note 22, at 117-19 (some courts prefer damage remedy over specific
performance because of the ease of entering one judgment compared to monitoring the completion of a
party's performance); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979)
(specific performance is both efficient and preferable to damages).
47. See Sykes, supra note 32, at 281, for a formal model.
48. Interestingly, a rough correspondence may arise between this notion of politically "efficient
breach" in GATT and efficiency from a societal standpoint. If the officials negotiating a trade agree-
ment anticipate that they can breach the agreement ex post when breach is efficient, their expected
gains from the agreement increase ex ante. In turn, they will become more willing to enter such
agreements, and trade liberalization will occur to a somewhat greater extent. As long as the costs of
additional protective measures ex post do not exceed the benefits of a greater number of concessions ex
ante, the overall costs of protection will decline. For further elaboration of this argument, and the
caveats that apply, see Sykes, supra note 32, at 278-89.
49. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XIX, XXVIII.
50. Id. art. XXVIII(4)(d).
51. See id. art. XIX(3)(a).
52. Trade statistics are usually readily available, and the parties can ordinarily determine with
reasonable confidence to what extent a new trade restriction has affected trade flows.
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and plainly precludes any sort of "massive retaliation" for breach. Like-
wise, it reflects an unwillingness on the part of the drafters of GATT to
rely solely upon renegotiation as a basis for adjusting the bargain.
Whatever the criticisms of the damages remedy as an alternative to spe-
cific performance in a private breach of contract action, 3 therefore, the
presence in GATT of the "substantial equivalence" principle suggests the
virtue of a "damages remedy" from the perspective of the GATT negotia-
tors. A plausible conjecture as to its importance is that signitories may at
times find it valuable to withdraw a concession when compensatory con-
cessions would be politically unpalatable as, perhaps, during a general
business cycle downturn. Then, the revocation of substantially equivalent
concessions abroad may minimize the joint political losses ex post, and the
parties to the agreement will prefer to facilitate such adjustment of the
bargain ex ante. In any event, the fact that GATT affords signatories the
"damages" option has important implications for the appropriate magni-
tude of unilateral sanctions to penalize breach of agreement under
GATT. A threat of massive unilateral sanctions, if credible, makes rene-
gotiation the only viable option for the avoidance of commitments. It
would thereby deny GATT signatories the benefit of the bargained-for
"damages" remedy in lieu of renegotiation and perhaps suggest the price
for avoidance of GATT obligations through renegotiation would be higher
than contemplated at the time of agreement. Such a strategy could well be
viewed as reneging on the bargain and thus discourage other nations from
entering additional trade agreements in the future. This observation sug-
gests the virtue of measured retaliation in response to any breach of agree-
ment and rules out various strategies for massive retaliation known to pro-
mote cooperation in games such as the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. 4
Further, in deciding upon the proper level of measured retaliation
under a unilateral sanctions policy, the bargain struck under GATT
likely provides a useful guide. Thus, the withdrawal of "substantially
equivalent concessions" seems an appropriate choice of unilateral sanction
to apply in the event of unsuccessful renegotiation.
53. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., RASMUSEN, supra note 34, at 91. Rasmusen explains the way in which mutual use
of the "grim" strategy-one player cooperates with the other player as long as the other player coop-
crates, but responds to a single period of non-cooperation with perpetual non-cooperation-sustains
cooperation as a perfect equilibrium in the repeated game. Id. The analogue here might be a strategy
that permanently revoked all GATT concessions to any party found to have violated GATT
obligations.
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3. Opportunism in Sanctions Policy
The proposition that the magnitude of the sanction ought to accord
with the terms of the bargain suggests a more general point. Just as stat-
utes such as Section 301 may serve the useful purpose of establishing
sanctions for cheating on trade agreements, they may also facilitate
"cheating." Rather than penalizing bona fide violations of GATT, for ex-
ample, Section 301 might be employed in efforts to foist opportunistic in-
terpretations of the agreement upon trading partners. If sanctions were
used for such purposes, or if trading partners feared they might be so
used, otherwise viable trade agreements could be frustrated.
Consequently, in the design of sanctions policy, it is important to in-
clude provisions that disable opportunism where possible. Provisions re-
quiring deference to the terms of existing trade agreements and prohibit-
ing sanctions for behavior that is in compliance plainly serve this function.
Likewise, if a bona fide dispute arises over the meaning of the bargain's
language, trading partners will be reassured by provisions requiring def-
erence to impartial third-party legal interpretation.
4. Size Disparities
To be effective at inducing compliance with trade agreements, threats of
unilateral sanctions, if carried out, must impose significant detriment
upon the target of the sanction. Large countries, such as the United
States, often have considerable coercive power, because their economies
represent a considerable percentage of the world market for many goods
and services. If access to the U.S. market is restricted, the target nation
cannot readily make up the losses by redirecting its exports.
In contrast, small nations may have less hope of influencing the behav-
ior of other nations through a unilateral threat of sanctions, as a loss of
access to their market may be of little consequence given alternative op-
portunities. Likewise, for many developing nations, threats to restrict im-
ports as a sanction may not be credible, because the bulk of their imports
are of vital raw materials that they cannot do without. Not surprisingly,
therefore, statutes such as Section 301 are the sole province of larger trad-
ing entities. Only the European Community has formally adopted a simi-
lar measure. 56
55. Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening of the Common
Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular Against Illicit Commercial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L
252). For a general discussion of this statute, see JACKSON, supra note 2, at 73-74. The Community's
measure was adopted in 1984, and is modeled fairly closely on Section 301. For a detailed description
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For several reasons, however, any limited ability of smaller nations to
issue effective threats of unilateral sanctions is not a telling objection to
threats of sanctions by larger nations. First, the powerlessness of smaller
nations should not be exaggerated-they are included in trade agreements
precisely because their concessions are of some value to others. A fortiori,
the withdrawal of those concessions will be of some detriment. Second,
"smallness" cuts both ways-if a nation is a tiny fraction of world supply
for most goods and services, then its loss of access even to a market as
large as the United States may not be terribly disadvantageous because it
may be able to redirect its exports to other markets without considerably
depressing prices. Third, smaller nations may be able to act collectively to
impose sanctions if the need arises. Fourth, as noted, "reputation" is an
important constraint upon opportunistic behavior by larger and smaller
nations alike. Both have considerable interest in playing by the rules to
ensure that dealings with them in the future will be perceived as worth-
while. Thus, smaller nations need not fear victimization by the unbridled
opportunism of larger nations. Finally, and most importantly, joint gains
arise simply from appropriate threats of sanctions by larger nations, even
if smaller nations cannot also use unilateral sanctions to contribute to po-
licing the bargain. The more that major trading powers are able to en-
courage other nations to adhere to their commitments under trade agree-
ments, the more the returns to such agreements will increase. More
agreements will then be negotiated, benefiting both small and large
nations.
Perhaps the best analogy for the size disparity problem is to the repos-
session remedy in certain consumer sales contracts, a remedy that is espe-
cially valuable when the costs of legal process are great in relation to the
value of the interest being protected. Absent the repossession remedy, sales
would be riskier and consumers who must buy on credit might confront
significantly higher prices. Thus, all can benefit from agreeing to allow
the seller to repossess. This is true even though the buyer has no viable
"self-help" remedy of his own in the event of a breach of contract by the
seller (such as a breach of warranty).
D. Implications: The Design of Section 301(a)
Section 301(a) applies when a foreign government practice "violates, or
is inconsistent with . . . or otherwise denies benefits to the United States"
of its provisions, see Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN FRANCOIS BELLIS, ANTIDUMPING AND OTHER TRADE
PROTECTION LAWS OF THE EEC 331-64 (2d ed. 1990); Partan, supra note 20, at 333.
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under a trade agreement,56 or "is in violation of, or inconsistent with"
other international legal rights of the United States and "burdens or re-
stricts United States Commerce."5 The terms "inconsistent" and "other-
wise denies benefits" are not explicitly defined, but plainly include, among
other things, practices denying the United States reasonably anticipated
commercial benefits, even if the practices do not technically violate the
letter of any trade agreement or other international legal obligation. 58 In
short, Section 301(a) applies when the foreign practice at issue impairs
the rights or reasonable expectations of the United States under interna-
tional agreements affecting commerce.
Plainly, Section 301(a) may be understood as a self-help strategy for
discouraging breach of agreement by trading partners. 9 Its announcement
of a policy whereby the United States will punish violation, and not re-
ward or ignore it, can deter violations while protecting the interests of the
United States in preserving access to foreign markets. The more difficult
56. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1988):
(a) Mandatory action
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines under section 2414(a)(1)
of this title that-
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being
denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country-
(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies
benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action in subsection (c) of this section, subject to the
specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action, and shall take all
other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President that the President
may direct that Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to enforce such rights
or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.
57. Id. § 2411 (d)(4)(A) ("An act, policy, or practice is unjustifiable if the act, policy, or practice
is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States.").
58. It is well established under GATT that a signatory can cause "nullification or impairment"
of benefits owing to another signatory through actions which on their face are consistent with GATT,
but nevertheless frustrate expectations. See GATT supra note 1, art. XXIII. The classic illustration
is the introduction of a subsidy to domestic producers after the subsidizing country has negotiated a
tariff ceiling or "binding" applicable to competing imports-even though the GATT does not explic-
itly restrict the ability of signatories to use domestic subsidies, the introduction of a new subsidy after
a tariff negotiation can disadvantage trading partners just as seriously as an illegal tariff increase and
frustrate the expectations developed in the course of the negotiations. See JACKSON supra note 31, at
376-78.
59. For an extended discussion of the 1988 amendments to these provisions, emphasizing a num-
ber of details not considered here, see Sykes, supra note 32, at 303.
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question is whether Section 301(a) simultaneously facilitates opportunism
by the United States, or raises fears of opportunism, and thereby creates
costs exceeding its benefits. A closer look, however, suggests that Section
301(a) considerably disables opportunism and is generally consistent with
terms of the primary bargain that it serves to enforce (the GATT).
1. Negotiation in Preference to Sanction
Procedurally, Section 301 cases may commence following a petition
from a private sector group60 or upon the USTR's own initiative." A
determination that the case has potential merit results in a decision to
"initiate" an investigation. The USTR must then request informal con-
sultations with the country in question." If these consultations do not
yield a satisfactory solution, the USTR may invoke formal dispute resolu-
tion pursuant to the international agreement in question-usually, though
not always, the GATT. 63 No later than eighteen months after the initia-
tion of the case, the USTR must make a determination whether the prac-
tice in question violates or is inconsistent with the legal rights of the
United States.64 If that determination is affirmative, the USTR must si-
multaneously determine what action to take in response to the practice.65
No retaliatory action is necessary if the foreign government agrees to mod-
60. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a).
61. Id. § 2412(b).
62. Id. § 2413(a)(1).
63. Id. § 2413(a)(2).
64. Id. § 2414(a)(1)(A).
65. Id. § 2414(a)(1)(B). The eighteen-month time limit, however, still applies even though for-
mal dispute resolution procedures under the applicable trade agreement may not have concluded. See
id. Extensions may be granted at the request of the petitioner under § 2412(a) or a majority of
representatives of the domestic industry that would benefit from the action under § 2412(b)(1) or
§ 2414(a)(3)(B). Section 2415(a)(2)(A)(ii) provides that an extension may be granted:
if the Trade Representative determines that substantial progress is being made, or that a
delay is necessary or desirable, to obtain United States rights or a satisfactory solution with
respect to the acts, policies, or practices that are the subject of the action.
This requirement was inserted in 1988, and is discussed in Kenneth J. Ashman, The Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988: The Section 301 Amendments-Insignificant Changes from Prior
Law?, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 115, 137-38 (1989). When a determination to take action has been made,
the action is to be implemented within 30 days, although USTR has fairly broad discretion to extend
this period by 180 days in most cases. See 19 U.S.C. § 2415(a); see also Ashman supra, at 138-39.
The eighteen-month limit, however, does not apply to actions relating to intellectual property pro-
tection brought under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A). For those actions, a six-month limit on the length
of the investigation applies, id. § 2414(a)(3)(A), unless USTR provides an express explanation for
delay. Id. § 2414(a)(3)(B).
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ify its practice to accord with the legal rights of the United States, or if the
foreign government provides the United States with satisfactory compensa-
tion for the violation in the form of trade concessions on other goods or
services."
In short, when a trading partner is found to have violated its obliga-
tions, it is first given the opportunity to bring its behavior into compliance
with those obligations before any sanction is imposed. It is also given an
opportunity to "renegotiate" by offering compensatory concessions. This
structure mimics the approach to dispute resolution under GATT Article
XXII167 and thus has the considerable virtue of respecting the terms of
GATT while still providing the United States with some leverage in the
face of GATT's inability to coerce signatories to comply with its terms.6"
Indeed, the argument might be made that these features of Section
301(a) are, if anything, too lenient toward violations. They seemingly en-
courage trading partners to cheat on obligations in the hope of avoiding
detection, knowing all sanctions can later be avoided by a cessation of
cheating. And, even if cheating were almost certain to be detected, trading
partners nevertheless might cheat in order to reap transitory gains pend-
ing the conclusion of formal dispute resolution.
There are, however, two counterarguments. Taken together they make
a reasonable case for this feature of the statute. First, when foreign gov-
ernments modify their policies to avoid U.S. sanction, their officials may
in many cases incur significant political cost by appearing to "capitulate"
to a U.S. threat. Even where they elect to conform their behavior to avoid
sanction, therefore, the penalty for the original cheating may at times be
significant.6 9
Second, and perhaps more persuasive, cases of blatant cheating under
trade agreements are very much the exception rather than the rule. Given
the opportunities to renegotiate embodied in trade agreements such as
GATT and the "escape clause" feature allowing nations to take protective
measures when an industry is "seriously injured, ' 70 the temptation to en-
gage in flagrant violations of commitments is largely removed. Flagrant
66. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(C).
67. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
69. Acceding to U.S. demands regarding trade concessions is often perceived as "caving in" by
foreign constituencies and can impose significant political costs on leaders perceived as weak in the
face of U.S. demands. See e.g., PMA Slams Thai Government's Patent Protection, PHARM. Bus.
NEWS, Feb. 15, 1991; Thai Pharmaceutical Patent Problem Reaches Impasse, PHARM. Bus. NEWS,
Feb. 16, 1990.
70. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX. For a discussion of uses of the escape clause, see gener-
ally Sykes, supra note 32; Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International
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violations mar the reputation of trading nations, as noted, and discourage
other nations from entering agreements with them. Given the legitimate
alternatives for protective measures without flagrant cheating, the reputa-
tional costs of flagrant cheating are rarely worth incurring.
Instead, "cheating" most often takes the form of a suspect construction
of an arguably ambiguous obligation. Under GATT, in particular, na-
tions can assert that their protective measures are justified by balance of
payments problems,7 1 or in the case of developing countries the need to
promote an infant industry.7 2 They may claim national security is at
stake 7 or their export restrictions avert a local short supply problem.
7 4
Measures restricting imports may be justified as public health measures,7 5
or measures necessary to protect domestic agricultural production.78 An
agricultural export subsidy may be said to be legitimate because it does
not yield a "more than equitable share" of world trade, 77 and an appar-
ently illegal export subsidy may be characterized as a legitimate domestic
subsidy coincidentally benefitting exporters almost exclusively. 8 In short,
under GATT and other trade agreements of interest, numerous provisions
exist that inevitably beget differences of interpretation. A review of past
Section 301 disputes confirms that such provisions form the basis for the
great majority of disputes involving alleged violations of agreements.7 9
Under these circumstances, the U.S. policy of delaying sanctions until
formal dispute resolution confirms the existence of a violation, followed by
a window of opportunity for the trading partner to conform its practices
without sanction, seems imminently sensible. A contrary approach, under
which the United States imposed upon other nations its unilateral inter-
pretation of ambiguous provisions, would create abroad greater apprehen-
sion of opportunism on the part of the United States. And, as noted ear-
lier, if trading partners anticipated the imposition by the United States of
a self-interested construction of ambiguous provisions in the event of a
dispute, they would be discouraged from entering agreements with the
Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV. 547, 579-99 (1987) (discussing the serious injury and substantial cause
standards).
71. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XII.
72. Id. art. XVIII.
73. Id. art. XXI.
74. Id. art. XX(j).
75. Id. art. XX(b).
76. Id. art. XI.
77. Id. art. XVI.
78. Id.
79. See infra note 144.
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United States at the outset.80 The conciliatory approach of Section 301(a)
may therefore be justified as a device for disabling opportunistic behavior
in the most common class of disputes where the parties have bona fide
differences over the terms of the bargain.
An important caveat relates to dilatory tactics by trading partners. Be-
cause of the consensus principle under GATT, a disputant can often delay
the formation of a panel for many months, and once a panel is formed it
can delay providing panel members with the information necessary to the
investigation. 81 If U.S. sanctions were certain to be delayed until the panel
completed its work, this strategy would appear attractive to any trading
partner who anticipated the possibility of an adverse panel ruling. To
counter this strategy, Section 301 now requires the USTR to make a uni-
lateral determination on the merits if formal dispute resolution fails to
conclude within eighteen months.82
Although this provision raises the distinct possibility of the imposition
of sanctions by the USTR based upon a unilateral construction of the
bargain, it is nevertheless justifiable if eighteen months provides sufficient
time for formal dispute resolution to conclude in the absence of dilatory
tactics.8" Then, any failure to obtain an impartial ruling is precipitated by
the other disputant. Under those circumstances, an adverse inference on
the merits of the position advanced by the other disputant seems war-
ranted-a fact that ought to be obvious to all trading nations. Conse-
quently, the reputational penalty ordinarily incurred for threatening sanc-
tions on the basis of a unilateral construction of the agreement should not
arise.
2. The Sanction
Failing agreement on modification of the challenged practice or com-
pensation, the statute provides a range of retaliatory options. These in-
clude the authority to impose duties or quantitative restrictions upon ex-
ports of goods and services from the country under investigation. 8 Any
such sanction must "be devised so as to affect goods or services of the
foreign country in an amount that is equivalent in value to the burden
80. See supra Section I(C)(3).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
82. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2). This aspect of the statute has been criticized extensively for its
possible GATT illegality.
83. This window of opportunity for modification of the practices in question has been curtailed
for actions brought under id. § 2412(b)(2)(A), see supra note 65, and it is unclear what effect the six-
month deadline will have on negotiation of settlement in those cases.
84. Id. § 2411(c).
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being imposed by that country on U.S. commerce."'" Thus, subject to
stated exceptions," the statute seemingly requires retaliation at a level no
more substantial than the detriment imposed upon U.S. interests by the
violation in question. Implicitly, it also suggests the duration of retaliation
should be limited to the duration of the objectionable practice. This prin-
ciple appears to be followed by the USTR."7
The earlier discussion of efficient breach and of the sanctions embodied
in various provisions of GATT provide a rationale for this limitation. The
equivalence requirement under Section 301 comports directly with the
GATT principle of allowing withdrawal of "substantially equivalent con-
cessions" by a party adversely affected by a tariff increase or escape clause
action, if compensation is not forthcoming.88 By placing an upper bound
upon the retaliatory sanction, Section 301 implicitly recognizes the virtues
of efficient breach and vindicates the bargain under GATT while preserv-
ing negotiating leverage.
E. A Note on the Uruguay Round
As indicated, the need for unilateral threat strategies to help enforce
existing trade agreements arises because of deficiencies in third-party dis-
pute resolution. Threat strategies would not be necessary if trade agree-
ments afforded cheap, impartial, and expeditious third-party adjudication
backed by the coercive authority to induce compliance with the bargain.
The prospects for improvement in GATT dispute resolution are, at this
writing, considerable. As noted, the most serious deficiency in GATT dis-
pute resolution is the "consensus" rule-the GATT cannot take action to
sanction breach of the agreement, or even to form a dispute resolution
panel, without a "consensus" that includes the party in violation. As a
consequence, an aggrieved party must in practice rely either on the will-
ingness of the violator to provide compensation through renegotiation or
on unilateral sanctions. The "consensus" rule has been attacked by a
number of commentators89 and may soon see some modification. Prior to
the suspension of Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1990, the
85. Id. § 2411(a)(3).
86. Sanctions may be stayed if, for instance: there is an agreement by the foreign country to end
or to phase out the practice in question; it is impossible for the foreign cour.-,y to achieve the results
desired; there is an agreement to provide compensatory trade benefits to the United States; or, when
the action would have an adverse impact upon the U.S. economy out of proportion to its benefits. 19
U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2).
87. See generally infra, Appendix.
88. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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dispute resolution negotiations produced a draft "Understanding on the
Interpretation and Application of Articles XXII and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.""0 As a step toward modification of
the consensus rule, the draft Understanding suggests granting a com-
plaining party the right to a dispute panel unless the GATT Council acts
to block its formation.91 It further provides for a twelve-month (or less)
time frame in which panels are to complete their work and have their
results considered by the GATT Council.92 The draft, if implemented,
also would establish an intermediate level of "appellate review" between
the panel decision and the final Council action.93 Finally, the draft sug-
gests an intention to modify the procedure for the authorization of sanc-
tions by the Council to make sanctions more likely if a signatory proves
recalcitrant.94 On the whole, therefore, the draft represents a significant
movement in the GATT toward the creation of a definitive process for the
interpretation of the Agreement, which cannot be impeded by a party in
violation. It also goes far toward establishing a system under which the
losing party in a dispute will be unable to block the authorization of
sanctions.
It remains to be seen how much of the draft will survive as a final
agreement, and indeed whether any final agreement will emerge.95 But if
the Uruguay Round does produce an effective procedure for third-party
dispute resolution, the need for unilateral threat strategies to protect U.S.
interests will diminish greatly. The continued existence of the statutory
authority for unilateral action may in fact become counterproductive, as
such actions may be perceived as facilitating opportunism while serving no
constructive function. If such a scenario arises, it may be desirable for
Section 301(a) to be amended in order to preclude sanctions not author-
ized by GATT in cases of GATT disputes. Section 301(a) may still play
a useful role in its current form, however, for protecting U.S. rights under
other commercial agreements, present or future. And, even with respect to
GATT disputes, it would still fulfill the useful functions of allowing pri-
90. See GATT SECRETARIAT, DRAFT FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS S.1-S.23 (Dec. 20, 1991) (on file with
Law and Policy in International Business).
91. Id. para. 4.
92. Id. para. 18.
93. Id. para. 15.
94. Id. para. 20.
95. The generally accepted consensus is that the draft agreement faces considerable hurdles in
Geneva. See Francis Williams, GATT: Pact With Power to Fuel Worldwide Boom, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1992, § I, at 4; Martin Wolf, The GATT Makes Its Last Stand, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, § I,
at 10.
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vate petitions to spur the government to act and empowering the President
to impose GATT-authorized sanctions.
II. THE USE OF THREATS ABSENT EXPRESS AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS
OF SECTION 301(B)
The case against passivity when trading partners violate their commit-
ments is a powerful one and provides at least plausible justification for
Section 301(a). But one must also consider the rest of Section 301. Provi-
sions in Section 301(b) authorize the USTR to retaliate against "unrea-
sonable or discriminatory" practices that "burden or restrict United States
commerce.""6 Such practices do not violate international agreements, and
the question arises whether the United States should ever employ the
"stick" in an effort to secure changes in such practices.
International trade theory offers some initial, limited insights. It sug-
gests that, subject to some standard caveats, more trade liberalization is
better than less, and hence reciprocal concessions are better than unilat-
eral concessions, holding constant the size of any unilateral concession.9 7
Of the caveats, however, the most important is directly relevant to discus-
sion of Section 301. If trade policy abroad is held constant, large countries
do not always gain from their own concessions, and are occasionally better
off eliciting unilateral concessions by trading partners if they can. This
proposition is an implication of "optimal tariff" theory which suggests, in
essence, that large countries can use tariffs to exploit the collective monop-
sony power of their consumers.18
In addition, even when reciprocal concessions are better than unilateral
concessions, unilateral concessions are still better than no concessions. Put-
ting aside the large country caveat, a unilateral reduction of protectionist
barriers will usually enhance the economic welfare of an importing nation
as well as its trading partners. Consequently, when reciprocal concessions
96. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
97. JOHN H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 25-26
(1986).
98. See, e.g., AVINASH DIXIT & VICTOR NORMAN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
150-52 (1980); JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI & T. N. SRINIVASAN, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 174-84 (1983). The analysis of monopoly power in trade is in fact somewhat more compli-
cated than the analysis of domestic monopsony, because it requires consideration of the exchange rate
fluctuations that attend changes in the level of protection.
Optimal tariff theory underlies a recent effort to explain a number of historical. trade wars. See
generally JOHN A. C. CONYBEARE, TRADE WARS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL RIVALRY (1987). It also underlies the discussion in Section I pertaining to
minimization of the costs of sanctions to the U.S. economy by using tariffs on goods with a low import
supply elasticity. See supra Section I(c)(4).
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are for some reason infeasible, threat strategies for obtaining unilateral
concessions may have merit. To be sure, if those strategies backfire and
result in greater protection through retaliatory moves, all nations will lose.
Perhaps the first question to ask about threat strategies, therefore, is
whether they have a reasonable chance of succeeding. On this issue, trade
theory must yield to game theory.
A. When Do Threats Work Best?
The discussion of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in Section I affords
one example of a strategic environment in which "threats" have value.
The initial conciliatory or "cooperative" move by each party to a lower
level of protection can be sustained by the threat of each player to aban-
don cooperation if the other does so first. The repeated Prisoner's Di-
lemma may have some direct applicability to trading relationships that are
not governed by a preexisting, express agreement-a proposition that will
be developed later.
Clearly, however, the Prisoner's Dilemma structure is not always de-
scriptive of the settings in which nations may contemplate threat strategies
to elicit concessions from others. In particular, the threatened sanction
may be costly to either the imposing nation (or their political officials),
holding constant behavior abroad. Suppose, for example, that the existing
level of protection has not been reduced in return for any reciprocal con-
cession abroad, but simply represents a politically optimal balancing of
import-consuming interests favoring liberalization and import-competing
interests favoring protection. An increase in the level of protection will
then impose a political cost at home unless an offsetting political benefit is
elicited through changes in behavior abroad. The question then arises
whether the threat to take an action that is costly rather than advanta-
geous to the officials issuing the threat, other things being equal, can be
credible and suffice to induce officials abroad to make the desired change
in their own policies.
Repeated games with this strategic structure have also been studied,
though not as much as the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The models
again suggest that many "equilibria" are possible. In some models, threats
are successful at eliciting the desired behavior and in others, they are
not.99 Empirical analysis and case studies also yield a range of findings.10
99. One recent paper, for example, considers an important class of problems of direct interest
here-whether a threat of sanctions that are costly to the country that employs them (if used) can
induce another country to take actions that disadvantage it. Jonathan Eaton & Maxim Engers, Sanc-
tions (NBER Working Paper No. 3399, July 1990). Their model rules out all possibility of retalia-
tory sanctions for simplicity sake and assumes an infinite horizon to avoid unraveling due to the
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Thus, neither theory nor accumulated experience provides any definitive
guidelines. Threat strategies can assuredly work, but they can likewise
fail.
Strategic analysis can, however, be helpful in revealing factors that may
make success more likely, or at least mitigate the consequences of failure,
and thereby increase the "expected returns" from threat strategies. For
example, asymmetries in economic power can affect the desirability of any
threat strategy. If the target of a threat has no capacity to retaliate effec-
tively, then the damage from an unsuccessful threat of sanctions cannot
exceed the damage done by the sanction itself when imposed. The down-
side risk of the threat strategy is thus lessened, other things being equal,
relative to cases in which damaging retaliation is a possibility. On aver-
age, smaller countries are likely to have fewer options for meaningful re-
taliation, because their smaller market shares reduce their ability to influ-
ence the price of exports from other countries. Likewise, threats of
retaliation by smaller countries are somewhat less likely to be credible,
because the burden of trade restrictions will fall primarily on their domes-
tic consumers rather than their foreign suppliers.
By the same reasoning, large countries are more likely to influence the
behavior of other nations with threat strategies. Their larger market
dominant strategies in the final period. In the simultaneous moves game, the conclusion is that the
"Folk Theorem" applies-any outcome that strictly Pareto dominates the "worst case" individually
rational outcome for both players is a possible equilibrium. Id. at 6-9. For the target of sanctions, this
"worst case" scenario in the model involves maximum sanctions and no capitulation. For the country
that threatens sanctions, this "worst case scenario" involves no capitulation by the target and no
sanctions. Thus, from the perspective of the country that threatens sanctions, the opportunity to im-
prove upon the equilibrium in which no sanctions are utilized and no capitulation occurs is clearly
present, and any equilibrium other than that one will represent improvement. Hence, in equilibrium,
the threat of sanctions cannot hurt the nation that employs the threat and can surely benefit it. An
important implication of the Folk Theorem in this model is that sanctions which are costly to the
employing country can nevertheless be credible threats. It is worth incurring a finite cost in the cur-
rent period to secure the long term benefits of changing the behavior of the target of sanctions. A
similar conclusion emerges from the authors' analysis of an alternating moves game, with strategies
restricted, for simplicity, to "Markov" strategies. Id. at 29.
Clearly, however, the rather optimistic *picture of sanctions in the Eaton & Engers model depends
significantly on the assumption that the target of sanctions has no possibility of retaliation. As the
authors put it in their conclusion, "lilf both parties can take actions with external benefits and impose
punishments then many more possibilities emerge." Id. at 30.
100. Most studies of past sanctions policies focus on the use of economic sanctions to achieve
political ends. A recent survey can be found in MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
U.S. TRADE (1990). By and large, commentary on the use of sanctions for such purposes suggests that
sanctions are often ineffective. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 74-76 (1983); GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 79 (1985).
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shares enable them to affect the export prices of their trading partners to a
greater extent through new trade restrictions; thus, they can impose
greater damage on the target of sanctions, on average, with a tariff or
quantitative restriction of given magnitude. Further, their threats are
more likely to be credible, because new trade restrictions do relatively less
damage to their own economies and more damage to trading partners.
Indeed, when a large country employs trade sanctions, its economy need
not suffer at all, as an appropriate tariff can conceivably increase eco-
nomic welfare as noted above."'
However unseemly the conclusion as a guide for policy, therefore,
threats are more likely to be effective when issued by larger countries
against smaller countries. A bully is more likely to sway the behavior of a
weakling.12
Similarly, in fashioning a threat, the proposed sanction should mini-
mize the cost to the imposing nation for the given damage imposed upon
the target. This policy increases the likelihood that the threat will be cred-
ible. It also minimizes the damage at home if the threat fails and the
sanction must be imposed as a result. Thus, for example, sanctions that do
not violate GATT are likely preferable to sanctions that do. Since a
GATT violation carries a reputational penalty, nations will be less likely
to enter trade agreements in the future if they perceive a greater chance of
a breach as part of unilateral sanctions policy.
Finally, as suggested above, only credible threats can induce the target
to capitulate. To enhance the appearance of credibility, the issuer of a
threat may wish to disable itself from "bluffing," or otherwise increase the
costs of inaction should the target of the threat prove intransigent. 3 For
example, political officials may take strong public positions threatening
retaliation, so that failure to retaliate in the face of intransigence would
make them look weak and impose significant political costs.
Much more might be said on these issues, but a thorough essay on
threats and sanctions in strategic interaction is not the objective here.
Rather, it suffices to note that threat strategies can prove fruitful, and
hence their use cannot be dismissed out of hand in cases when reciprocal
concessions are an unattractive substitute. This conclusion holds whether
101. Of course, if interest group politics determines the choice of the sanction rather than a
thoughtful economic analysis, then the economic costs of the sanction to the large country can be
increased considerably.
102. Bhagwati makes much the same point. See JAGDtSH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 124
(1988) (discussing the fact that the United States traditionally takes the upper hand in bilateral trade
negotiations with weaker countries).
103. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52 (1960).
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threatened sanctions would benefit or disadvantage the officials who em-
ploy them. The analysis now proceeds to another critical question: when,
if ever, are threat strategies preferable to concessions as a way to gain
access to foreign markets?
B. The Limited Case for Threats
Without purporting to offer an exhaustive list of cases, there are several
settings in which threat strategies in the absence of prior express agree-
ments warrant serious consideration because concessions may be impru-
dent or infeasible. Likewise, there are settings in which threat strategies
appear quite ill-advised.
Cutting across all of these settings is the issue of the consequences of
preferential, bilateral concessions. Under GATT, tariffs and other cus-
toms barriers must be applied on a "most-favored-nation" basis,"' subject
to exceptions involving developing countries,'05 customs unions,1"6 and
free trade areas.1"7 Thus, putting aside the exceptions, GATT signatories
cannot impose a ten percent tariff on widgets from country X and a
twenty percent tariff on widgets from country Y, if both X and Y are
members of GATT. Country Y is entitled to the ten percent most-fa-
vored-nation rate.1 08 Consequently, when the United States uses threat
strategies to encourage nations to comply with their GATT obliga-
tions-the subject of Section I above-it ordinarily will not encourage dis-
crimination in favor of the United States, as such discrimination is gener-
ally forbidden.
When the United States extracts concessions on matters outside the
scope of GATT and other trade pacts requiring most-favored-nation poli-
cies, however, it may well engender discrimination in its favor-a com-
mon objection to "bilateralism" 10 9 in trade policy. Such discrimination is
not only harmful to third countries that find their exports displaced by the
United States, but is a source of potentially serious inefficiencies world-
wide. For example, suppose the tariff on widgets exported from the
United States to country X is ten percent, and the tariff on widgets ex-
104. 104 See GATT, supra note 1, arts. I, XIII.
105. Id. arts. XII, XVIII.
106. Id. art. XXIV.
107. Id.
108. GATT requires that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any con-
tracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded imme-
diately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties." Id. art. I.
109. "Bilateralism" involves any preferential reduction of trade barriers between two countries.
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ported from country Y to country X is twenty percent. The result may
well be an incentive for excessive investment in widget production within
the United States, driven not by the superior efficiency of U.S. production,
but by the comparatively low tariff rate on U.S. exports.
Even though the United States will gain from such preferences, the ef-
fect on worldwide economic welfare can easily be adverse, and the welfare
effect on third countries is almost invariably so. Indeed, the welfare effect
in the importing nation may even be adverse if, by giving the United
States a preference, it switches to a higher cost supplier (the United
States) for its imports and the gain to consumers due to a lower price is
insufficient to offset the loss in tariff revenue.110
These observations have two important implications. First, if the
United States is to pursue policies that result in preferential bilateral con-
cessions, it must either be comfortable with the possibility of reducing
worldwide welfare or rule out certain concessions because of their adverse
effects on others. 1 Of course, if the pursuit of self-interest at the expense
of others is palatable, this issue need not influence policy.
Second, the possibility of a retaliatory response by third nations must
always be considered. If the United States increases its exports to country
X at the substantial expense of the European Community, for example,
the Community may not react passively. In assessing the wisdom of any
threat strategy, therefore, the effects of the proposed concessions on third
countries and their likely response must always be considered.
With these issues in the background, consider the following settings in
which threat strategies are comparatively appealing and unappealing.
1. Increased Protection Abroad
Suppose a U.S. trading partner significantly increases the level of pro-
tection in its home market for some industry or sector. Assume this change
in policy does not violate any existing trade agreement with the United
.States,112 but nevertheless imposes considerable harm upon U.S. export
110. For a discussion of the welfare economics of preferential tariffs, see BHAGWATI &
SRINIVASAN, supra note 98, at 271-90.
111. The alternative, of course, is to insist that concessions be applied on a most-favored-nation
basis, but such concessions often will be more costly to the importing nation politically, and thus will
be more difficult to obtain. See Baldwin, supra note 32, at 250-53, 256-59.
112. A change in trade policy would be permissible if the trading partner was not a party to
GATT, or if the protective trade measure implemented was not covered by GATT. Since GATT only
applies to trade in goods, there are few regulations covering barriers to service exports. See ALAN C.
SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 222 (1991). Furthermore, GATT only covers "bound" tariffs
on which the contracting parties commit either not to raise the existing rate or to lower the existing
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interests. Furthermore, suppose the United States openly pursues a policy
of accepting without challenge any new protective measure abroad that
does not violate international agreements and undertakes to secure the re-
moval of such trade barriers only through subsequent offers of conces-
sions. This strategy has two potentially serious deficiencies. First, it in-
vites trading partners to raise protective barriers for the very purpose of
lowering them to obtain subsequent concessions. Prior to a GATT negoti-
ating round, for example, the United States might anticipate an increase
in unbound tariffs abroad and the necessity of significant U.S. concessions
simply to restore the status quo ante. Eventually, the United States might
offer all politically feasible concessions and still have made little progress
in securing better access to foreign markets. It would gain economically to
the extent lowering barriers to imports was advantageous, but would lose
the opportunity to gain in export markets as well.
Second, even putting aside cases in which protection abroad increased
for the purpose of extracting subsequent concessions from the United
States, a "concessions only" strategy forgoes the opportunity to maintain
access to foreign markets through "implicit cooperation." Return for a
moment to the stylized Prisoner's Dilemma of Section I,11 and suppose
an express agreement to maintain "low" protection in each country is for
some reason infeasible. An equilibrium in which both countries adhere to
"low" protection might nevertheless evolve without express agreement
over the course of repeated interaction. Neither the theoretical nor the
experimental studies of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma suggest the need
for any formal agreement to sustain the cooperative solution.114 Thus, for
example, each country might unilaterally adopt a "tit for tat" policy,
keeping its market open as long as the other country does the same, while
periodically checking to see whether the other country is adhering to
"low" protection. For such equilibria to evolve, however, threat strategies
are essential after each country has made its initial "concession" (in the
stylized model, a reduction of protection from "high" to "low").
Of course, the strategic interaction among trading nations is vastly more
complex than the stylized 2x2 Prisoner's Dilemma, and rarely, if ever,
does one observe implicit initial "concessions" that might be sustained
thereafter by "tit for tat" or some other threat strategy. Indeed, if implicit
rate to a specified level and keep the tariff at that level. Id. at 229. "Unbound" tariffs, by definition,
are not included in the tariff schedules annexed to GATT. As a result, there is no GATT provision
which would prevent a country from raising an unbound tariff by as much as it desired. See GATI',
supra note 1, art. II.
113. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 38-40 an accompanying text.
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"concessions" are attractive to each nation, why not memorialize them in
an explicit agreement? The transaction costs of doing so are arguably
modest given all the opportunities for diplomatic contacts between govern-
ments. The absence of express agreement is perhaps good evidence of the
absence of any agreement. Thus, it is surely too simplistic to imply that
every increase in protection abroad should be viewed as "cheating" on an
implicit bargain over reciprocal concessions.
Nevertheless, the analogy to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is not
completely inapt. All nations maintain protective barriers that are not cov-
ered by any international agreement, and this situation will assuredly con-
tinue whatever the outcome of the Uruguay Round. A prospect of system-
atic retaliation when those barriers are increased may well discourage
nations from increasing protection in many instances, at least when the
political gains are small. This, in turn, will discourage the trading com-
munity from drifting toward greater protection in areas not yet subject to
the discipline of international agreements.
As for the costs, the damage to the U.S. economy when deterrence fails
and sanctions must be imposed can, in principle, be kept to a modest level
by exploiting the principles of optimal tariff theory. 1 6 Indeed, any effec-
tive "sanction" inevitably exploits the teachings of optimal tariff theory to
some extent. A restriction on access to the U.S. market cannot possibly
impose any detriment upon a trading partner unless the United States has
some monopsony power over the price of the good or service at issue.
Were it otherwise, the costs of the trade restriction would pass through in
full to the U.S. consumer and impose no harm upon foreign producers. In
choosing among possible targets of sanction, the United States may also be
able to strengthen its hand by targeting the exports of powerful interest
groups abroad--those capable of exerting considerable pressure upon their
governments to capitulate and avoid sanction.
Finally, although counter-retaliation in response to U.S. sanctions is al-
ways a concern, it seems less likely in this class of cases as long as the
magnitude of the sanction is roughly commensurate with the initial harm
to the United States. Sanctions, then, have a purely reactive quality, re-
sponding to greater protectionism abroad with measured retaliation but
not initiating protectionism."'
An obvious caveat is that the United States should not retaliate if to do
so would violate an express bargain. In addition, because sanctions are
costly, it would be foolhardy to respond to every move abroad that in-
115. See supra note 98.
116. Sanctions thus have the qualities of the "tit for tat" strategy that Axelrod finds so congenial
to efforts at sustaining implicit cooperation. See AXELROD, supra note 41, at 57-63.
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creases protective barriers. Action should be limited to instances in which
U.S. interests are significantly impaired. It seems equally clear, however,
that a policy of passivity in response to every "legal" increase in protec-
tion abroad invites opportunism and forgoes a potentially valuable oppor-
tunity to restrain the level of protection in sectors where the discipline of
GATT and other international agreements has yet to emerge.1 1
7
2. Ambiguity Revisited
Many contracts have ambiguous provisions. The transaction costs of
clarifying the terms of the bargain ex ante can be considerable and the
gains modest, either because the probability of pertinent contingencies ma-
terializing is small, or because the parties expect to work out the details of
their relationship over the course of dealing in the long term.
International trade agreements also have considerable ambiguities, a
problem compounded by the absence of background default rules from
statutes or the common law. Indeed, as suggested in Section I, the bulk of
GATT disputes arise over conflicts of interpretation.1 18 Dispute panels
may provide sufficient guidance to develop settled "common law" inter-
pretations. Unfortunately, this mechanism for clarifying the bargain does
not always work. A dispute panel may decline to issue an interpretation of
a seemingly highly ambiguous provision.'19 Indeed, signatories may not
even bother to seek a dispute panel if the provision at issue is so unclear
as to defy crisp interpretation.
When this problem becomes important with respect to a particular pro-
vision, perhaps the ideal solution is for signatories to return to the bar-
gaining table for further negotiations. Nonetheless, GATT negotiating
117. An argument might be made that any increase in protection not prohibited by an existing
agreement ought to be viewed as implicitly authorized by existing agreements. The difficulty with
such an argument is that many matters of commercial significance have never been addressed in the
course of international negotiations, probably due to their modest importance historically. The fact
that GATT, only within the past few years, has undertaken to bring trade in services within its
coverage does not establish that, prior to such agreement, signatories implicitly agree to let each other
pursue any policy they want in the services area. Rather, the lack of any agreement covering services
likely reflects the fact that the transaction costs of negotiating a services agreement have been high in
relation to the value of such an agreement. See NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW
PATTERNS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT 405-06 (1989).
118. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., GATT, European Economic Community-Subsidies on Exports of Wheat Flour,
31 Supp. B.I.S.D. 263, para. 17 (1985), reprinted in part in JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J.
DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 735 (2d ed. 1986) (dispute
panel unable to determine whether export subsidies by EC provided its exporters with'more than an
"equitable share" of world trade in wheat flour).
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rounds are infrequent, and signatories must adapt to ambiguity in the
interim. Under these circumstances, opportunities for implicit cooperation
may again become important. Tacit convergence upon particular interpre-
tations of the agreement are in fact familiar in GATT, even tacit conver-
gence on agreement to ignore portions of the existing text. 20
Drawing once again upon the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, tacit coop-
eration might emerge if signatories can identify the "efficient" interpreta-
tion of the agreement-that is, the interpretation the signatories would
negotiate for themselves in the absence of transaction costs-and then ad-
here to that interpretation as long as others do the same. Actions inconsis-
tent with the efficient interpretation would be met with some sanction.
To be sure, the sanction need not involve protective measures. For ex-
ample, if the dispute arises because the United States believes the Euro-
pean Community is subsidizing its agricultural exports excessively and
thereby acquiring "more than an equitable share of world export
trade ,' 121 export subsidies by the United States might constitute the ap-
propriate sanction. But mirror image behavior may not always be the best
option. An alternative sanction may exist that imposes the same harm on
the target of the sanction, at less cost to the United States. Further, in
some disputes, the opportunity to engage in mirror image behavior may
not exist. 1
22
Thus, whatever the practice that manifests opportunism in the face of
ambiguous provisions, circumstances may arise in which sanctions against
the exports of the nation at issue are a plausible response. Such measures
can, in principle, encourage all parties to an agreement to adhere to an
efficient construction of the bargain. In addition, to the extent unilateral
policies succeed in enhancing the efficiency of performance, all nations
gain ex ante. The returns to participation in the agreement increase, and
reciprocal trade agreements become more attractive.
This analysis is subject to an obvious objection. When a country offers
a unilateral interpretation of an ambiguous provision, backed by a threat
of sanctions against countries that do not adhere to the interpretation,
what is to guarantee the proposed interpretation is the "efficient" one and
not itself an opportunistic one? Only the good faith and good judgment of
120. See Sykes, supra note 32, at 287 (discussing "unforeseen development" and "effect of obli-
gations incurred" language in Article XIX which have, for all intents and purposes, been read out of
that Article).
121. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XVI(3).
122. If a developing country invokes Article XVIII under dubious circumstances, the United
States has no opportunity to do the same because it is not a developing country. Id. art. XVIII (infant
industry protection).
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officials who administer such policies can prevent a battle of contrary,
opportunistic positions. Thus, although the problem of opportunism in the
face of ambiguity provides a reasonable justification for occasional sanc-
tions in theory, it may or may not provide convincing justification in prac-
tice, given the institutional imperfections associated with the administra-
tion of sanctions policy.
3. The GSP Interface
GATT authorizes developed nations to extend tariff preferences to de-
veloping nations, and the United States has done so quite liberally in the
past pursuant to its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).123 As a
result of GSP, most of the politically "easy" concessions have already been
made to GSP beneficiaries. The import restrictions that remain on their
products tend to be on items of high sensitivity such as textiles, footwear,
sugar, and the like. 24
In addition, several factors lead developing nations to protect their mar-
kets heavily. As noted earlier, Article XII of GATT authorizes protection
for balance of payments purposes."2 5 Developing nations regularly take
advantage of this provision to impose tariffs or quantitative restrictions to
discourage imports, arguing that their hard currency earnings from ex-
ports must be conserved to pay public debts denominated in foreign cur-
rency. 2 In addition, Article XVIII, concerning governmental aid to eco-
nomic development, authorizes protection to promote the development of
infant industries. 27 Finally, because access to the markets of developing
countries has, in many cases, only recently become a matter of economic
significance, developing nations have not always been asked for substantial
concessions in return for access to the markets of developed countries. 2
123. See U.S.I.T.C., HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (1990) [herein-
after HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE]. A list of GSP beneficiary countries, and of countries entitled
to further preferences in accordance with the Caribbean Basin Initiative, may be found in id. General
Notes, at 2-11. Statutory authority for a Generalized System of Preferences may be found in 19
U.S.C. § 2461 (1988). GSP affords duty free or reduced duty treatment to over 4000 products from
135 countries. See U.S.I.T.C., OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 149 (1989). The
present beneficiary nations include several major U.S. trading partners, such as Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina.
124. See HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE, supra note 123, at 10-11; see also 19 U.S.C. §
2463(c).
125. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XII.
126. See Peter Winship, Book Review, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 546 (1987) (reviewing NATAN
ELKIN, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DES PIRLFERENCES GtNIRALISLES (1985)).
127. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XVIII.
128. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 275-81 (1989).
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All of these factors combine to produce a situation in which the average
level of protection in developing nations is far higher than for the devel-
oped nations in GATT."2 9 Consequently, while U.S. firms seeking to ex-
port to developing nations regularly confront sizeable trade barriers, many
developing countries exporting to the United States receive preferential,
virtually duty free, treatment.
For several reasons, this asymmetry in the level of protection may well
justify the occasional use of threat strategies to open the markets of devel-
oping nations. First, because of GSP, further concessions by the United
States may at times be politically infeasible. Indeed, in some instances, the
United States may be unable to offer enough to secure the desired conces-
sion, even putting political considerations to the side. Second, the wide
differences in the average level of protection, coupled with the existence of
special preferences, provide the United States with a certain amount of
political "high ground" when it asks for liberalization. This observation
addresses not only to the fairness of the U.S. position, but may provide
officials abroad with some political comfort when acceding to U.S. de-
mands. The smaller the political costs of accepting U.S. demands, the
greater the likelihood of success of the threat strategy.
Third, because of GSP, threats can be recharacterized as concessions, a
difference that is more than semantic. The GSP is subject to periodic re-
view, and the United States can assert that a continuation of preferences is
conditional upon the beneficiary adopting a reasonable trade policy to-
ward the United States. In effect, the continuation of GSP benefits be-
comes a "carrot" in return for concessions abroad, and what is on the
surface a threat strategy can in fact become a mutually advantageous re-
ciprocal concessions strategy. Concessions by developing countries will en-
courage U.S. officials to maintain GSP preferences in the face of rising
imports under the program.'
Finally, the danger of counter-retaliation is plainly diminished in the
case of developing nations. Their market power is on average smaller, and
because they already maintain high trade barriers, their options for new
trade restrictions are more limited.
129. Id. at 277.
130. See, e.g. Suthipon Thaveechaiyagarn, Current Developments: Section 301 Cigarette Case
Against Thailand - A Thai Perspective, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 367 (1990).
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4. "Ineffective" Concessions: A Note on Japan
Rudiger Dornbusch has recently argued for the systematic use of Sec-
tion 301 against Japan.' He believes that a variety of poorly understood
non-tariff barriers, perhaps cultural in nature, impede U.S. exports. Con-
ventional reciprocal concessions, he suggests, will not address the problem,
and thus he urges the United States to pressure Japan to establish quanti-
tative targets for import growth, akin to the quantitative targets in the
U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement."'
Both the empirical premise and the proposed remedy in Dornbusch's
argument are controversial. The proposition that unique impediments ex-
ist to penetrating the Japanese market may or may not be correct. A com-
bination of language barriers, quality problems, and marketing ineptitude
on the U.S. side may explain much of the apparent difficulty in selling to
Japan. Likewise, the perception that selling in Japan is unduly difficult
may be an artifact of its persistent trade surplus, attributable in part to
the need for foreign capital in the United States driven by U.S. fiscal
policy, and the ability of the Japanese to supply it.
Further, even if unique non-tariff barriers exist in Japan and are im-
portant, it is not clear that the Japanese government has the capacity to
do much about them. It does little good to threaten the Japanese govern-
ment with sanctions if no action by that government would enable the
United States to achieve its objectives. Dornbusch concedes the point by
proposing not that Japan offer conventional trade concessions, but that it
offer the United States a guaranteed rate of growth in its exports, presum-
ably assured by a policy of government persuasion, government procure-
ment orders, or outright import subsidization.' 3 3
Even if one accepts arguendo the desirability of such policies, however,
it is certainly questionable whether the Japanese government would em-
brace them in response to threats of sanction, at obvious political cost to
the officials who appear to capitulate to U.S. demands. Further, export
growth targets for the United States could easily result in significant dis-
placement of exports from other sources, such as Europe, and the likely
adverse reaction of those other countries must be considered. The capacity
of the Japanese to retaliate in response to the imposition of sanctions can
also hardly be doubted. Notwithstanding the persistent trade imbalance
between the United States and Japan and the various other reasons ad-
131. Rudiger W. Dornbusch, Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism, in AN
AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s at 106, 124 (Robert Z. Lawrence & Charles
L. Schultz eds., 1990).
132. See id. at 124.
133. Id.
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vanced for an aggressive stance under Section 301, therefore, threat strate-
gies here appear quite risky.
5. Long Standing Practices
Subject to exceptions implied by the first three categories above, it is
usually imprudent to threaten nations with sanctions if they refuse to dis-
mantle long standing trade barriers. The argument against a threat of
sanctions in these cases relates closely to the argument in favor of sanc-
tions in response to new protectionist actions abroad."" Recall that one
objection to offering a concession in exchange for the elimination of a new
trade barrier is that such a strategy encourages nations to erect new trade
barriers to extract concessions. In the end, all politically feasible conces-
sions may be made without having much effect on the overall level of
protection abroad.
By much the same reasoning, if a nation dismantles its long standing
trade barriers in response to threats and obtains no concessions in return,
it will eventually have nothing left with which to bargain in the course of
future negotiations for reciprocal concessions. Anticipating this prospect,
nations can be expected to be especially resistant to U.S. demands to open
their market when the challenged practice involves a long extant trade
barrier.
Compounding the problem is the fact that the United States hardly oc-
cupies the "high ground" in most of these cases. For every long standing
barrier impeding U.S. exports to the country at issue, that country can
likely point to a long standing barrier impeding its exports to the United
States."3 5 Even ignoring the apparent unfairness of the U.S. demand for a
unilateral concession under these circumstances, capitulation by foreign
officials will be politically awkward and thus comparatively unlikely.
Other things being equal, therefore, the fact that a practice is well estab-
lished should weigh very heavily in favor of the "carrot" rather than the
"stick."
6. Threats Following Unsuccessful Trade Negotiations
Another class of cases in which the "stick" seems especially ill-advised
consists of those in which the "carrot" has already been tried and either
failed altogether, or produced an inadequate level of concessions from the
U.S. perspective. If the United States has bargained for a concession
134. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
135. See Keith Bradsher, As U.S. Urges Free Markets, Its Trade Barriers Are Many, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al.
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abroad and been unable to secure it in the course of a GATT negotiating
round or some comparable forum, the impasse provides valuable informa-
tion. It suggests that the political costs of the concession to officials of the
country in question are considerable and the likelihood of success with
any particular threat is accordingly diminished.
In addition, if the United States adopts a strategy of attempting to se-
cure through threats those concessions for which it has proven unwilling
to "pay" with its own concessions, it impairs the value of trade negotia-
tions to its trading partners. Suppose, for example, that the United States
accepted a certain package of concessions in return for its own, but later
informed the other party to the bargain that it would revoke some U.S.
concession unless further concessions were forthcoming. Such behavior
amounts to breach of contract. Yet the threat of imposing a sanction under
Section 301 if further concessions are not forthcoming is analytically
equivalent to the threat of revoking one of the initial concessions and is
thus much the same as reneging on the bargain. If trading partners antici-
pate such behavior, they will expect to gain less from reciprocal trade
agreements with the United States and consequently be less inclined to
enter them.
C. Implications: The Design of Section 301(b)
Foreign government practices that do not violate U.S. legal rights nev-
ertheless violate Section 301(b) if they are "unreasonable" or "discrimina-
tory" and in addition "burden or restrict United States commerce."" 6 An
"unreasonable" act is defined as an act that is "unfair and inequitable."1 '
The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of unreasonable
acts, including denial of "market opportunities" or "opportunities for the
establishment of an enterprise," failure to protect intellectual property
rights, engagement in export targeting, and denial of worker rights. 1
The statute offers no comprehensive definition of "discriminatory" acts. It
does indicate, however, that such acts include a denial of most-favored-
nation or national treatment 9 in "appropriate" cases involving goods,
services, or investment. " '
136. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1988).
137. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(A).
138. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B).
139. Id. § 2411 (d)(4)(B). "National treatment" requires the foreign government in question to
afford the same benefits and opportunities to the United States as are afforded to domestic nationals.
Id.
140. Id. § 2411(d)(5).
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Plainly, these definitions encompass virtually any trade practice the
USTR wishes to attack. Every governmental restriction upon U.S. exports
of goods and services or U.S. investment, and every purported deficiency
in the protection of intellectual property, is potentially "unreasonable."
Likewise, every regulatory restriction applicable to U.S. firms or inves-
tors, but not to others, is potentially "discriminatory." And, to the extent
such practices have any adverse impact upon U.S. commercial interests, a
burden or restriction upon U.S. commerce arises.
Because Section 301(b) provides little indication of which practices will
be subject to challenge, it is inconceivable that foreign governments will be
deterred from engaging in "unfair" behavior. Rather, its ambiguity simply
provides the USTR with the option to utilize the "stick" in negotiating for
the removal of trade barriers whenever the USTR finds it advantageous.
Conceivably, this breadth of agency discretion is unavoidable. Although
it is possible, as above, to define categories of cases in which threats seem
a more appealing strategy than elsewhere, perhaps an exhaustive listing
would be too difficult to formulate. The statute might take the alternative
approach of disabling the USTR from issuing threats in certain classes of
cases, as where the practice in question is long standing or has been the
express topic of prior GATT negotiations. These restrictions, however,
might require a list of exceptions, such as when the target country is a
GSP beneficiary with a high average level of protection. The proper list of
exceptions might be as difficult to specify as the proper list of cases in
which threats may be desirable.
Yet the absence of statutory guidance carries considerable risks. Most
obviously, the USTR may use its discretion unwisely, challenging prac-
tices under conditions when the likelihood of success is low and of retalia-
tion is high, or acting in a manner that discourages trading partners from
negotiating with the United States for reciprocal concessions. As drafted,
for example, Section 301(b) could be invoked to challenge indisputably
permissible practices under GATT. And, the mere fear that Section 301
may be used to renege on the bargain may diminish the willingness of
other countries to negotiate with the United States. The risk of abuses due
to regulatory "capture" is also perhaps somewhat greater when the regu-
lators have broad discretion. The statute might be administered to benefit
the constituency of the President rather than to pursue threat strategies
when the potential gains and the likelihood of success are greatest. Thus,
an argument might be made for statutory changes to prohibit the use of
Section 301(b) in some cases, such as those in which the behavior abroad
is indisputably legal under express agreements and does not fall within
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some list of exceptions tailored to capture the cases in which threats are
relatively attractive.14
It is difficult to say much more in the abstract about the wisdom of
Section 301(b). The lack of detail means there are few details to discuss.
As the statute is presently drafted, therefore, its utility will turn heavily
upon the skillfulness with which the USTR utilizes its extensive discre-
tion. Hence, what remains is to examine the historical experience with
Section 301.
III. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH SECTION 301
A comprehensive, quantitative assessment of how Section 301 has af-
fected U.S. trade is likely to be impossible. Trade statistics do not exist at
a proper level of aggregation for all of the products and services at issue.
Further, a myriad of variables account for changes in trading volumes,
and it would require an extraordinary wealth of data on economic condi-
tions in other countries to control properly for these variables and isolate
the effects of Section 301. Consequently, the analysis to follow is far less
ambitious and relies upon the most crude indicators of success and failure.
Drawing upon U.S. government sources, the Appendix lists prominent
characteristics of Section 301 cases filed since the inception of the statute
through 1990. It indicates the filing date and the date of termination or
suspension for closed and inactive cases. It indicates the nature of the
practice under investigation, as well as the reason it was challenged: to
gain access to the market of the target country; to eliminate "unfair" com-
petition in third country markets; to protect the U.S. home market; to gain
opportunities for investment in the target country; to induce the target
country to afford better intellectual property protection; or to eliminate
export restrictions in the target country that increase the cost of raw
materials to U.S. industries. The Appendix also indicates whether the
challenged practice was alleged to violate an international trade agreement
with the United States and whether a formal, international dispute resolu-
tion body ruled on the allegation. It notes whether the investigation in-
volved agricultural products, a notoriously contentious area under GATT
with highly ambiguous GATT obligations, and whether the target coun-
try was at the time of filing a GSP beneficiary.
Most importantly, the Appendix indicates whether, in the course of the
investigation, the target country acceded to U.S. demands either in whole
141. A similar argument has been made in the past. See, e.g., Patricia L. Hansen, Defining
Unreasonableness in International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J.
1122 (1987).
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or in part by modifying or abolishing the challenged practice. It also indi-
cates whether, in lieu of modifying its practice, the target country pro-
vided compensatory concessions. Finally, the Appendix indicates whether
the United States retaliated at any time under Section 301 and, if so, the
nature of the retaliation and its duration.
The listing includes a number of cases filed but never formally "initi-
ated." Counting these cases, the total number of investigations is ninety-
four. Of this total, only eleven cases were devoted exclusively to allega-
tions of "unfair" U.S. imports and had as their sole objective the reduction
of import competition in the U.S. market.1" 2 Most of these import cases
were de facto countervailing duty actions filed in the early 1980s."' 3 Since
the concern of this paper is with the use of threats to gain access to for-
eign markets, and since these cases overlap significantly with other trade
statutes, further discussion of them is omitted. This exclusion leaves a to-
tal of eighty-three cases with clear market-opening objectives or related
goals involving exports to third country markets, barriers to foreign in-
vestment, access to raw materials, or intellectual property protection
abroad.
Any inferences from the information in the Appendix are subject to two
obvious cautions. First, not all cases are of equal economic significance.
The gains to the United States from many small "successes" may be
swamped by the costs of retaliation in a single large "failure." Second,
apparent "success" need not translate into actual "success." If the country
under investigation agrees to modify its practices, but substitutes some
subtle nontariff barrier or some barrier that does not violate any interna-
tional agreement, the United States may gain little. Third, even when the
foreign government concession effectively eliminates the barrier in ques-
tion, the use of threats may do damage to U.S. relations with that govern-
ment, which may have adverse effects upon other matters of importance to
U.S. interests. Hence, all of the conclusions to follow are tentative.
142. See EC/Japan Steel Diversion to U.S. (301-10), 43 Fed. Reg. 3962 (USTR 1978) (final
admin. review); EC Pasta Export Subsidies (301-25), 51 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1986) (final ad-
min. review); Austria, France, Italy, Sweden, U.K., and Belgium Specialty Steel Subsidies (301-27 to
31, 33), 48 Fed. Reg. 33,233 (USTR 1983); Canada Railcar Export Subsidies (301-32), 47 Fed.
Reg. 42,059 (USTR 1982) (final admin. review); Canada Raw Fish Export Controls (301-55), 53
Fed. Reg. 33,207 (USTR 1989) (final admin. review); Canada Softwood Lumber (301-87), 56 Fed.
Reg. 58,944 (USTR 1991).
143. Another de facto countervailing duty case under Section 301 was initiated in 1991 regard-
ing Canadian softwood imports. See Canada Softwood Lumber (301-87), 56 Fed. Reg. 58,944
(USTR 1991).
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A. Cases Involving Alleged Breach of Agreement
Of the eighty-three cases involving market-opening or related initia-
tives, a clear majority (forty-eight)"" included alleged violations of U.S.
144. See Canada Egg Quotas (301-2), 41 Fed. Reg. 9430 (USTR 1976) (final admin. review);
EC Levies on Egg Albumin (301-3), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,758 (USTR 1980) (final admin. review); EC
Minimum Import Price & License Practices, Canned Fruits (301-4), 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR
1979) (final admin. review); EC Export Subsidies on Malt (301-5), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,558 (USTR
1980) (final admin. review); EC Export Subsidies on Wheat Flour (301-6), 45 Fed. Reg. 51,169
(USTR 1983) (subject to Uruguay Round negotiations); EC Variable Levy on Sugar Added (301-7),
45 Fed. Reg. 41,254 (USTR 1980) (final admin. review); EC Soybean (301-8), 44 Fed. Reg. 1504
(USTR 1979) (final admin. review); EC Citrus Preferences (301-11), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR
1988) (final admin. review); Japan Silk Import Policies (301-12), 43 Fed. Reg. 8876 (USTR 1978)
(final admin. review); Japan Leather Quotas (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1986) (settlement
reached); EC Wheat Export Subsidies (301-16), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (USTR 1980) (investigation
settled by adoption of Tokyo Round Subsidies Code); Japan Cigars (301-17), 46 Fed. Reg. 1389
(USTR 1981) (final admin. review); Argentina Marine Insurance (301-18), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,732
(USTR 1980) (investigation suspended); Japan Pipe Tobacco (301-19), 46 Fed. Reg. 1388 (USTR
1981) (final admin. review); Japan Surplus Rice Sales (no initiation) (USTR 1980) (petition availa-
ble at the Office of the United States Trade Representative); EC Sugar Export Subsidies (301-22), 47
Fed. Reg. 28,361 (USTR 1987) (addressed in Uruguay Round negotiations); EC Poultry Export
Subsidies (301-23), 47 Fed. Reg. 30,699 (USTR 1982) (addressed in Uruguay Round negotiations);
Argentina Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989 (USTR 1982) (final admin. review); EC Canned
Fruit Production (301-26), 54 Fed. Reg. 41,708 (USTR 1989) (final admin. review); Canada Front
End Loaders Duty Remission (301-34), 47 Fed. Reg. 51,029 (USTR 1982) (bilateral consultations
continuing); Brazil Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-35), 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (USTR
1982) (case remains open); Japan Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-36), 51 Fed. Reg.
9435 (USTR 1986) (case remains open); Korea Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-37),
51 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (USTR 1985) (case remains open); ROC Non-rubber Footwear Import Restric-
tions (301-38), 48 Fed. Reg. 56,561 (USTR 1983) (petition dismissed); Korea Wire Rope Subsidies
(301-39), 48 Fed. Reg. 55,790 (USTR 1983) (final admin. review); Brazil Soybean Oil and Meal
Subsidies (301-40), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984) (final admin. review); Portugal Soybean Oil
and Meal Subsidies (301-41), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984) (final admin. review); Spain Soybean
Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-42), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984) (final admin. review); ROC Rice
Export Subsidies (301-43), 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (USTR 1984) (final admin. review); EC Fertilizer
Standards (301-47), 49 Fed. Reg. 39,937 (USTR 1984) (consultations continuing); Japan Semicon-
ductors (301-48), 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (USTR 1987) (agreement reached, but compliance ques-
tioned); EC Enlargement (301-54), 56 Fed. Reg. 30,945 (USTR 1991) (final admin. review); Ca-
nada Raw Fish Export Controls (301-55), 53 Fed. Reg. 33,207 (USTR 1989) (final admin. review);
India Almond Tariffs and Licensing Policy (301-59), 53 Fed. Reg. 21,757 (USTR 1988) (final ad-
min. review); EC Third Country Meat Directive (301-60), 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (USTR 1987) (final
admin. review); EC Meat Hormones (301-62), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990) (interim market
access agreement); Korea Beef Licensing (301-65), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990) (final admin.
review); Japan Citrus Quotas (301-66), 53 Fed. Reg. 25,714 (USTR 1988) (final admin. review);
EC Copper Scrap Export Restrictions (301-70), 55 Fed. Reg. 7859 (USTR 1990) (final admin. re-
view); EC Canned Fruit (301-71), 54 Fed. Reg. 41,708 (USTR 1989) (final admin. review); Thai-
land Cigarettes (301-72), 55 Fed. Reg. 49,724 (USTR 1990) (final admin. review); Brazil Import
Licensing (301-73), 55 Fed. Reg. 22,876 (USTR 1990) (final admin. review); Norway Toll Equip-
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legal rights under existing trade agreements, usually rights under GATT.
Agricultural disputes have been the most common, (twenty-six out of
forty-eight), " 5 suggesting that conflicts attributable to imprecise GATT
obligations are an important source of Section 301 actions. Only a modest
number of the cases, thirteen of forty-eight, involved GSP beneficiaries. " 6
Of the forty-eight breach of agreement investigations brought under
Section 301(a), the foreign country eliminated or modified the challenged
practice, or provided compensatory concessions, in thirty-one of them. Of
the remaining seventeen cases, the dispute remains the subject of ongoing
negotiations in thirteen cases; the case was deemed "settled" by the adop-
ment (301-79), 55 Fed. Reg. 19,692 (USTR 1990) (final admin. review); Canada Import Restrictions
on Beer (301-80), 57 Fed. Reg. 308 (USTR 1991) (final admin. review); EC Enlargement (301-81),
55 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (USTR 1990) (final admin. review); EC Third Country Meat Directive
(301-83), 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (USTR 1991); PRC Market Access Barriers (301-88), 57 Fed. Reg.
3084 (USTR 1991).
145. See Canada Egg Quotas (301-2), 41 Fed. Reg. 26,758 (USTR 1976); EC Levies on Egg
Albumin (301-3), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,758 (USTR 1980); EC Minimum Import Price & License Prac-
tices, Canned Fruits (301-4), 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR 1979); EC Export Subsidies on Malt
(301-5), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,558 (USTR 1980); EC Export Subsidies on Wheat Flour (301-6), 45 Fed.
Reg. 51,169 (USTR 1983); EC Variable Levy on Sugar Added (301-7), 45 Fed. Reg. 41,254 (USTR
1980); EC Soybean (301-8), 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR 1979); EC Citrus Preferences (301-11), 50
Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1988); EC Wheat Export Subsidies (301-16), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (USTR
1980); Japan Pipe Tobacco (301-19), 46 Fed. Reg. 1388 (USTR 1981); EC Sugar Export Subsidies
(301-22), 47 Fed. Reg. 28,361 (USTR 1987); EC Poultry Export Subsidies (301-23), 47 Fed. Reg.
30,699 (USTR 1984); Brazil Soybean Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-40), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR
1984); Portugal Soybean Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-41), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984); Spain
Soybean Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-42), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984); ROC Rice Export
Subsidies (301-43), 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (USTR 1984); EC Enlargement (301-54), 56 Fed. Reg.
30,945 (USTR 1991); EC Third Country Meat Directive (301-60), 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (USTR
1987); EC Meat Hormones (301-62), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990); Korea Beef Licensing
(301-65), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990); Japan Citrus Quotas (301-66), 53 Fed. Reg. 25,714
(USTR 1988); EC Canned Fruit (301-71), 54 Fed. Reg. 41,708 (USTR 1989); Brazil Import Li-
censing (301-73), 55 Fed. Reg. 22,876 (USTR 1990); EC Third Country Meat Directive (301-83),
56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (USTR 1991).
146. See Argentina Marine Insurance (301-18), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,732 (USTR 1980); Argentina
Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989 (USTR 1982); Brazil Non-rubber Footwear Import Restric-
tions (301-35), 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (USTR 1985); Korea Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions
(301-37), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1985); Taiwan Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions
(301-38), 48 Fed. Reg. 56,561 (USTR 1983) (petition dismissed); Korea Wire Rope Subsidies
(301-39), 48 Fed. Reg. 55,790 (USTR 1983); Brazil Soybean Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-40), 49
Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984); Portugal Soybean Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-41), 49 Fed. Reg.
5915 (USTR 1984); ROC Rice Export Subsidies (301-43), 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (USTR 1984); India
Almond Tariffs and Licensing Policy (301-59), 53 Fed. Reg. 21,757 (USTR 1988); Korea Beef Li-
censing (301-65), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990); Thailand Cigarettes (301-72), 55 Fed. Reg.
49,724 (USTR 1990); Brazil Import Licensing (301-73), 55 Fed. Reg. 22,876 (USTR 1990).
[Vol. 23
HeinOnline  -- 23 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 310 1992
CASE FOR SECTION 301
tion of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code in one case;14 the petition was
dismissed as meritless in one case;148 and the United States modified its
own product standards to comply with those abroad in one case, thereby
mooting the dispute." 9 In only one instance did the investigation prove a
clear "failure," resulting in the cancellation of the U.S.-Argentina Hides
Agreement in 1982.150
As for retaliation, some manner of sanction was imposed in seven out of
the forty-eight cases. 6' The sanctions were lifted in their entirety twice
after subsequent settlements were negotiated, 52 and a sanction remains in
place in six cases,""5 though the level of sanction in some of those cases
has declined. The incidence of retaliation has declined somewhat over
time, with only three instances of retaliation in the last twenty-two
cases,15 4 and sanctions were subsequently lifted for the most part in each
case.' 5 5 Only one instance of retaliation involved a GSP beneficiary (Ar-
147. EC Wheat Export Subsidies (301-16), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (USTR 1980) (settled by
adoption of Tokyo Round Subsidies Code).
148. Taiwan Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-38), 48 Fed. Reg. 56,561 (USTR
1983) (petition dismissed as meritless).
149. EC Third Country Meat Directive (301-60), 56 Fed. Reg. 1663 (USTR 1987) (U.S.
plants modified to meet EC inspection requirements).
150. Argentina Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989 (USTR 1982) (cancellation of U.S.-Argen-
tina Hides Agreement).
151. See EC Citrus Preferences (301-11), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1988); Japan Leather
Quotas (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1986); Argentina Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989
(USTR 1982); Japan Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-36), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435
(USTR 1985); Japan Semiconductors (301-48), 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (USTR 1987) (agreement
reached, but compliance questioned); EC Enlargement (301-54), 56 Fed. Reg. 30,945 (USTR 1991);
EC Meat Hormones (301-62), 55 Fed. Reg. 1663 (interim market access agreement).
152. See EC Citrus Preferences (301-11), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1988) (sanctions lifted);
EC Enlargement (301-54), 56 Fed. Reg. 30,945 (USTR 1991).
153. See Japan Leather (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1986) (sanction remains in place);
Argentina Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989 (USTR 1982) (sanction remains in place after can-
cellation of U.S.-Argentina Hides Agreement); Japan Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions
(301-36), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1985) (sanction in place); Japan Semiconductors (301-48), 52
Fed. Reg. 43,146 (USTR 1987); EC Meat Hormones (301-62), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990);
Canada Import Restrictions on Beer (301-80), 57 Fed. Reg. 308 (USTR 1991).
154. See Japan Semiconductors (301-48), 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (USTR 1987) (agreement
reached, but compliance questioned); EC Meat Hormones (301-62), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR
1990) (some duties suspended by compromise); Canada Import Restrictions on Beer (301-80), 57 Fed.
Reg. 308 (USTR 1991).
155. No claim is made here, or elsewhere in this section, of any "statistical significance." Small
sample problems plainly abound.
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gentina);'5 ' three involved the European Community' 57 and three in-
volved Japan. 5
The target country acceded to U.S. demands, at least in part, in eight
out of nine export promoting cases where a dispute panel ruled in favor of
the United States.1 59 In one case, foreign intransigence has resulted in
lasting retaliation.' ° It is instructive that settlements were reached with-
out the need for formal dispute resolution in a substantial percentage of
the investigations.
Of the thirteen cases involving GSP beneficiaries, one petition was dis-
missed as meritless. 6 ' In the remaining twelve cases, the foreign country
acceded to U.S. demands ten of twelve times;"6 2 both exceptions arising in
cases involving Argentina.' 3
It is, of course, impossible to know how many of these disputes would
have been resolved to the satisfaction of the United States even in the
absence of a Section 301 proceeding. But, subject to this and earlier dis-
156. Argentina Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989 (USTR 1982) (retaliation against GSP
beneficiary).
157. EC Citrus Preferences (301-11), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1988); EC Enlargement
(301-54), 56 Fed. Reg. 30,945 (USTR 1987); EC Meat Hormones (301-62), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376
(USTR 1990) (interim market access agreement).
158. See Japan Leather Quotas (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1986); Japan Non-rubber
Footwear Import Restrictions (301-36), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1985); Japan Semiconductors
(301-48), 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (USTR 1987).
159. See EC Soybean (301-8), 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR 1979); EC Citrus Preferences
(301-11), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1988); Japan Silk Import Policies (301-12), 43 Fed. Reg.
8876 (USTR 1978); Japan Leather Quotas (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1986); EC Subsi-
dies on Canned Fruit (301-26), 54 Fed. Reg. 41,708 (USTR 1989); Canada Raw Fish Export Con-
trols (301-55), 53 Fed. Reg. 33,207 (USTR 1989); EC Soybean Processing Subsidies (301-63), 55
Fed. Reg. 4294 (USTR 1990); Korea Beef Licensing (301-65), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990);
Thailand Cigarettes (301-72), 55 Fed. Reg. 49,724 (USTR 1990); Canada Import Restrictions on
Beer (301-80), 57 Fed. Reg. 308 (USTR 1991).
160. Japan Leather Quotas (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (USTR 1986).
161. ROC Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-39), 48 Fed. Reg. 55,790 (USTR
1983).
162. See Brazil Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-35), 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428
(USTR 1985); Korea Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (301-37), 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428
(USTR 1985); Korea Wire Rope Subsidies (301-39), 48 Fed. Reg. 55,790 (USTR 1983); Brazil
Soybean Oil and Meal Subsidies (301-40), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984); Portugal Soybean Oil
and Meal Subsidies (301-41), 49 Fed. Reg. 5915 (USTR 1984); ROC Rice Export Subsidies
(301-43), 49 Fed. Reg. 10,761 (USTR 1984); India Almond Tariffs and Licensing Policy (301-59),
53 Fed. Reg. 21,757 (USTR 1988); Korea Beef Licensing (301-65), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR
1990); Thailand Cigarettes (301-72), 55 Fed. Reg. 49,724 (USTR 1990); Brazil Import Licensing
(301-73), 55 Fed. Reg. 22,876 (USTR 1990).
163. Argentina Marine Insurance (301-18), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,732 (USTR 1980); Argentina
Hides (301-24), 47 Fed. Reg. 53,989 (USTR 1982).
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claimers, the overall impression suggested by this quick review of the cases
is that Section 301 is fairly successful at inducing foreign governments to
modify their practices when they are accused of violating U.S. legal rights.
Countries often accede to U.S. demands prior to the conclusion of formal
dispute resolution, and where dispute panels complete their work, a find-
ing favorable to the United States usually results in a settlement accept-
able to USTR.'" Retaliation has been fairly uncommon. Because the
"success" rate appears to be so high, it is difficult to identify factors that
seem terribly important to the likelihood of success or failure. Nothing in
this group of cases is inconsistent with the proposition that success is more
likely with a GSP beneficiary, however, or the complementary proposition
that retaliation is more likely in cases involving larger trading partners
such as the European Community or Japan.
B. Cases Not Involving Alleged Breach of Agreement
Of the eighty-three cases not involving efforts to protect the U.S. home
market, thirty-five were instances in which the practice under investiga-
tion was not alleged to violate any international obligation. 6 Virtually all
164. See EC Soybean (301-8), 44 Fed. Reg. 1504 (USTR 1979); EC Citrus Preferences
(301-11), 50 Fed. Reg. 30,146 (USTR 1988); Japan Leather Quotas (301-13), 51 Fed. Reg. 9435
(USTR 1986); EC Subsidies on Canned Fruit (301-26), 54 Fed. Reg. 41,708 (USTR 1989); Korea
Beef Licensing (301-65), 55 Fed. Reg. 20,376 (USTR 1990); Thailand Cigarettes (301-72), 55 Fed.
Reg. 49,724 (USTR 1990); Canada Import Restrictions on Beer (301-80), 57 Fed. Reg. 308 (USTR
1991).
165. See Guatemala Shipping Practices (301-1), 41 Fed. Reg. 9430 (USTR 1976) (final admin.
review); ROC Tariffs on Home Appliances (301-9), 42 Fed. Reg. 61,103 (USTR 1976) (final admin.
review); USSR Marine Insurance (301-14), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (USTR 1979) (suspension remains
in effect); Canada Broadcasting Deduction (301-15), 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (USTR 1980) (mirror
image legislation-Trade & Tariff Act of 1984-remains in effect); Korea Insurance (301-20), 45
Fed. Reg. 85,539 (USTR 1980) (final admin. review); Switzerland Eyeglass Frames (301-21), 45
Fed. Reg. 81,703 (USTR 1980) (final admin. review); Venezuela Dried Prunes (no initiation)
(USTR 1980) (petition available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative); Argentina
Air Courier Restrictions (301-44), 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (USTR 1984) (1989 agreement provides for
non-discriminatory treatment of foreign air couriers in Argentina); ROC Films (301-45), 49 Fed.
Reg. 18,056 (USTR 1984) (final admin. review); EC Subsidies of Satellite Launching (301-46), 50
Fed. Reg. 29,631 (USTR 1985) (final admin. review); Brazil Informatics (301-49), 54 Fed. Reg.
43,880 (USTR 1989) (final admin. review); Japan Cigarette Import Restrictions (301-50), 51 Fed.
Reg. 35,995 (USTR 1986) (final admin. review); Korea Insurance (301-51), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,443
(USTR 1986) (amendment clarified in 1988 to allow some Korean firms to participate in joint ven-
tures); Korea Intellectual Property Rights (301-52), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (USTR 1986) (final admin.
review); Argentina Soybean Differential Export Taxes (301-53), 52 Fed. Reg. 18,685 (USTR 1988)
(final admin. review); ROC Customs Valuation (301-56), 51 Fed. Reg. 37,528 (USTR 1986) (final
admin. review); ROC Restrictions on Beer, Wine, Tobacco (301-57), 51 Fed. Reg. 44,958 (USTR
1986) (final admin. review); ROC Export Performance Requirements (307-01), 51 Fed. Reg. 41,558
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of the cases involving U.S. exports of services, restrictions on foreign in-
vestment by U.S. companies, and alleged inadequacies of intellectual
property protection abroad, fall into this category, along with a number of
others.
Notwithstanding the absence of any alleged infringement of U.S. legal
rights, these cases were also fairly successful at inducing foreign govern-
ments to eliminate or modify their practices. Such "success" occurred in
twenty-seven of the thirty-five cases.16 6 Of the remaining eight cases, the
(USTR 1986) (final admin. review); Brazil Pharmaceutical Patents (301-61), 55 Fed. Reg. 27,324
(USTR 1990) (final admin. review); Korea Cigarettes (301-64), 53 Fed. Reg. 20,406 (USTR 1988)
(final admin. review); Korea Wine Tariffs (301-67), 54 Fed. Reg. 4099 (USTR 1989) (final admin.
review); Argentina Pharmaceutical Patents (301-68), 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1226
(Sept. 17, 1989) (successful termination); Korea Motion Picture Distribution Restrictions (no initia-
tion) 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1444 (Nov. 2, 1988) (agreement to eliminate discrimina-
tory practices); Japan Construction Service Barriers (301-69), 56 Fed. Reg. 37, 934 (USTR 1991)
(final admin. review); Japan Satellites (301-74), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,764 (USTR 1990) (investigation
suspended); Japan Supercomputers (301-75), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,761 (USTR 1990) (investigation sus-
pended); Japan Forest Products (301-76), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,763 (USTR 1990) (investigation sus-
pended); India Investment Restrictions (301-77), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,765 (USTR 1990) (final admin.
review); India Barriers to Insurance Sales (301-78), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,766 (USTR 1990) (final admin.
review); Thailand Copyright Enforcement (301-82), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,114 (USTR 1991) (agreement
to improve intellectual property protection); Japan Barriers to Sale of Transformers (no initiation) 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1467 (Sept. 26, 1990) (accord reached and petition withdrawn);
ROC Barriers to Distilled Spirits (no initiation) 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 89 (Jan. 16,
1991) (market opening accord, petition withdrawn); Thailand Patent Protection (301-84), 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 64 (Jan. 8, 1982) (successful termination); India Intellectual Property
(301-85), 56 Fed. Reg. 61,447 (USTR 1991) (investigation extended); PRC Intellectual Property
(301-86), 57 Fed. Reg. 3084 (USTR 1991) (final admin. review).
166. See Guatemala Shipping Practices (301-1), 41 Fed. Reg. 9430 (USTR 1976); ROC Tariffs
on Home Appliances (301-9), 42 Fed. Reg. 61,103 (USTR 1976); USSR Marine Insurance
(301-14), 45 Fed. Reg. 49,428 (USTR 1979); Korea Insurance (301-20), 45 Fed. Reg. 85,539
(USTR 1980); Venezuela Dry Prunes (no initiation) (USTR 1980); Argentina Air Courier Restric-
tions (301-44), 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (USTR 1984); Brazil Informatics (301-49), 54 Fed. Reg. 43,880
(USTR 1989); Japan Cigarette Import Restrictions (301-50), 51 Fed. Reg. 35,995 (USTR 1986);
Korea Insurance (301-51), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,443 (USTR 1986); Korea Intellectual Property Rights
(301-52), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (USTR 1986); Argentina Soybean Differential Export Taxes
(301-53), 52 Fed. Reg. 18,685 (USTR 1988); ROC Customs Valuation (301-56), 51 Fed. Reg.
37,528 (USTR 1986); ROC Restrictions on Beer, Wine, Tobacco (301-57), 51 Fed. Reg. 44,958
(USTR 1986); ROC Export Performance Requirements (307-1), 55 Fed. Reg. 41,558 (USTR 1986);
Brazil Pharmaceutical Patents (301-61), 55 Fed. Reg. 27,324 (USTR 1990); Korea Cigarettes
(301-64), 53 Fed. Reg. 20,406 (USTR 1988); Korea Wine Tariffs (301-67), 54 Fed. Reg. 4099
(USTR 1989); Argentina Pharmaceutical Patents (301-68), 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at
1226; Korea Motion Picture Distribution Restrictions (no initiation) 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
43, at 1444 (Nov. 2, 1988); Japan Construction Service Barriers (301-69) 56 Fed. Reg. 37, 934
(USTR 1991); Japan Satellites (301-74), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,764 (USTR 1990); Japan Supercomputers
(301-75), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,764 (USTR 1990); Japan Forest Products (301-76), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,763
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petition was dismissed as meritless in one;167 it was withdrawn for undis-
closed reasons in one (possibly a favorable settlement);' 68 two cases were
"settled" by a commitment to participate in Uruguay Round services ne-
gotiations;' 6' the United States modified its own product standards to
moot one dispute;7 and two cases remain open.' The only complete
"failure" was the Canadian broadcasting dispute involving tax incentives
for Canadian firms to advertise on Canadian stations in preference to U.S.
stations-mirror image legislation was enacted by the United States and
remains in effect. 2 The other use of retaliation was against Brazil in a
pharmaceutical patent rights case.171
Although GSP beneficiaries were the target of less than one-fourth of
the cases involving alleged breach of trade agreements, they were the tar-
get of twenty out of thirty-five cases here. In seventeen instances, the ben-
eficiary agreed to eliminate or modify the challenged practice. " " Of the
(USTR 1990); Thailand Copyright Enforcement (301-82), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,114 (USTR 1991); Ja-
pan Barriers to Sale of Transformers (no initiation) 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1467 (Sept.
26, 1990); ROC Barriers to Distilled Spirits (no initiation) 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 89
(Jan. 16, 1991); PRC Intellectual Property (301-86), 57 Fed. Reg. 3084 (USTR 1991).
167. EC Subsidies of Satellite Launching (301-46), 50 Fed. Reg. 29,631 (USTR 1985).
168. ROC Films (301-45), 49 Fed. Reg. 18,056 (USTR 1984).
169. See India Investment Restrictions (301-77), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,765 (USTR 1990); India Bar-
riers to Insurance Sales (301-78), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,766 (USTR 1990) (to be settled by Uruguay
Round negotiations).
170. Switzerland Eyeglass Frames (301-21), 45 Fed. Reg. 81,703 (USTR 1980).
171. Thailand Patent Protection (301-84), 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 64 (Jan. 8,
1982) (open); India Intellectual Property (301-85), 56 Fed. Reg. 61,447 (USTR 1991) (investigation
extended).
172. Canada Broadcasting Deduction (301-15), 45 Fed. Reg. 51,173 (USTR 1980). The Presi-
dent determined on August 1, 1980, that the most appropriate response was legislation to mirror in
U.S. law the Canadian practice. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 232.
173. Brazil Pharmaceutical Patents (301-61), 55 Fed. Reg. 27,324 (USTR 1988) (tariffs held in
place for two years).
174. See Guatemala Shipping Practices (301-1), 41 Fed. Reg. 9430 (USTR 1976); ROC Tariffs
on Home Appliances (301-9), 42 Fed. Reg. 61,103 (USTR 1976); Korea Insurance (301-20), 45
Fed. Reg. 85,539 (USTR 1980); Venezuela Dried Prunes (no initiation) (USTR 1980); Argentina
Air Courier Restrictions (301-44), 49 Fed. Reg. 45,733 (USTR 1984); Brazil Informatics (301-49),
54 Fed. Reg. 43,880 (USTR 1989); Korea Insurance (301-51), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,443 (USTR 1986);
Korea Intellectual Property Rights (301-52), 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (USTR 1986); Argentina Soybean
Differential Export Taxes (301-53), 52 Fed. Reg. 18,685 (USTR 1988); ROC Customs Valuation
Practices (301-56), 51 Fed. Reg. 37,528 (USTR 1986); ROC Restrictions on Beer, Wine, Tobacco
(301-57), 51 Fed. Reg. 44,958 (USTR 1986); Brazil Pharmaceutical Patents (301-61), 55 Fed. Reg.
27,324 (USTR 1988); Korea Cigarettes (301-64), 53 Fed. Reg. 20,406 (USTR 1988); Argentina
Pharmaceutical Patents (301-68), 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1226); Korea Motion Picture
Distribution Restrictions (no initiation) 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1444 (Nov. 2, 1988);
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other five cases, the petition was withdrawn in one;7 5 a commitment to
Uruguay Round negotiations settled two;1 6 and the other two remain
open. 7 ' Retaliation occurred only once, as noted, against Brazil.
Official sources provide only limited background on the practices at is-
sue in these cases. Thus, for example, it is not possible to tell whether the
challenged practices were new or long standing. It is clear from the nature
of the challenged practices, however, that few of them involve topics which
might have been the topic of prior GATT negotiations.
Again, subject to the disclaimers discussed above, the overall impression
is that the statute works fairly well. Foreign governments accede to U.S.
demands, at least in part, in the clear majority of cases when the United
States presses its position to a conclusion. Retaliation is infrequent, and
there is no evidence that the USTR exercises its discretion imprudently to
renege on prior U.S. commitments through Section 301. Finally, a hefty
majority of investigations involve disputes in which threat strategies have
relatively greater appeal-those involving GSP beneficiaries.
CONCLUSION
Despite the widespread international criticism of U.S. actions under
Section 301,178 and the many calls for its repeal, 179 theory suggests that a
threat of unilateral sanctions can serve a valuable purpose in certain trade
disputes. A prospect of sanctions can encourage foreign nations to comply
with" their obligations under reciprocal trade agreements, with attendant
benefits to the economies of both nations. It can also discourage opportu-
nism in the face of ambiguous obligations, discourage rising protectionism
in sectors not yet subject to the discipline of international agreements, and
encourage developing nations to liberalize their highly restrictive trade
policies. Of course, imprudent use of the "stick" in international trading
relations can also produce economically undesirable retaliation and
counterretaliation and undermine efforts to achieve further trade liberali-
zation through a process of reciprocal concessions. But upon a preliminary
and admittedly tentative review of the U.S. experience with Section 301,
Thailand Copyright Enforcement (301-82), 56 Fed. Reg. 67,114 (USTR 1991); PRC Intellectual
Property Protection (301-86), 57 Fed. Reg. 3084 (USTR 1991).
175. ROC Films (301-45), 49 Fed. Reg. 18,056 (USTR 1984).
176. India Investment Restrictions (301-77), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,765 (USTR 1990); India Barriers
to Insurance Sales (301-78), 55 Fed. Reg. 25,766 (USTR 1990).
177. Thailand Patent Protection (301-84), 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 64 (Jan. 8,
1982); India Intellectual Property (301-85), 56 Fed. Reg. 3084 (USTR 1991).
178. See supra note 16.
179. See supra note 20.
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there is little evidence that these adverse consequences have materialized.
To the contrary, target countries accede to U.S. demands in a considerable
majority of cases, and retaliation is infrequent. The USTR defers to ongo-
ing international negotiations in resolving disputes and respects the pro-
cess of formal dispute resolution under existing trade agreements.
This rather favorable assessment of Section 301 may or may not survive
with time. Thus far, the USTR seems to have resisted capture by import-
competing interest groups, and Section 301 has not become a pretense for
imposing new protectionist measures for the benefit of the President's con-
stituency. The design of the statute may have much to do with the fact
that Congress entrusted the "stick" to the same agency representing the
United States in reciprocal trade negotiations. The USTR would impair
its ability to succeed in this aspect of its function if it were to employ
Section 301 to cheat on existing bargains, or to challenge long standing
practices that are more appropriately modified through an exchange of
"carrots." One cannot rule out the possibility that the USTR's practices
will change and that the existence of Section 301 will at some point be-
come counterproductive. Likewise, as noted, an expansion of GATT cov-
erage coupled with improvements in GATT dispute resolution may
greatly reduce the need for unilateral measures such as Section 301.
Thus, the message here is not that Section 301 is ideally designed or
that it must remain ever and always a part of the U.S. trade policy arse-
nal. Rather, the claim is much more modest-in response to those who
have been so critical of the statute in the past, it is important to recognize
that a limited theoretical case can be made for unilateral threat strategies,
and that Section 301 in many though by no means all of its particulars is
consistent with such theoretical arguments. Further, the worst fears of
critics regarding capture, opportunism, and unilateralism have simply not
materialized to date, and the limited evidence available suggests instead
that the statute may have been reasonably successful in promoting the
national economic interest. For these reasons, Section 301 is perhaps one
of the rare successes among U.S. trade statutes, uncharacteristic in its
commitment to opening markets rather than protecting them.
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